šŸ“–

Beanstalk University Class #54

Date
December 6, 2022
Timestamps
ā€¢ 0:00 Intro ā€¢ 0:50 Update on Wells ā€¢ 6:00 Revisiting Seed allocation per Deposit ā€¢ 18:45 Beanstalk Forks ā€¢ 19:40 What is in BIP-30? ā€¢ 24:58 A new tool that would allow Beanstalk to control the supply of Beans ā€¢ 37:04 How would a fork of Beanstalk work? ā€¢ 41:18 Is Bean being off-peg a concern? ā€¢ 44:41 Closing Statements
Type
Beanstalk University

Recordings

Meeting Notes

Updates on Wells

  • There is no real update on the Wells, but from an infrastructure standpoint, Beanstalk Farms is making good progress. Beanstalk Farms and Halborn are working on a lot of documentation around the base Beanstalk code base
  • Publius mentions they are scoping out what it would look like to have a BEAN:ETH Well ready for audit in early Q1 then push back the generalized version

Revisiting Seed allocation per Deposit

  • Currently Beanstalk is below peg and farmers are not converting, there is currently some friction between converting LP to Beans because of the loss of 2 Seeds per BDV
  • Publius think Beanstalk would want to optimize around how far off, and how long Beanstalk has been off the peg.
  • Publius thinks the real question is when the Stalk and Seed gauge system is implemented, what should they be functions of? It is a tough question and Publius thinks it is worthy of more study
  • Publius thinks it does not make sense to have multiple Seed per BDV per token because in practice the tokens that have BDV functions are going to be the base assets that trade against Beans
  • Currently Seeds per BDV is a fixed value, but in the future when Seeds per BDV fluctuates, Publius thinks it makes sense to set ranges or the DAO is always voting on the number of Seeds per BDV
  • Publius does not know when this will be implemented but they are hoping this is a big focus in 2023

Beanstalk Forks

  • If the DAO disagreed on risk management or assets to whitelist in the Silo, when does it make sense to fork Beanstalk and how would it work
  • This is something Publius thinks this is something to consider when on-chain governance comes back

What is in BIP-30?

  • Pipeline and Depot are separate contracts from Beanstalk, Pipeline allows a user to call functions and group them together within the EVM into one transaction.
  • BIP-30 wraps Pipeline in a new Depot facet
  • BIP-30 also changes the Sunrise() function base reward from 100 Beans to 25 Beans. This is a short-term fix until the new Sunrise() parameters are ready to be purposed. This will save Beanstalk around 60,000 Beans over the next month

A new tool that would allow Beanstalk to control the supply of Beans

  • To preface this, Mod323 says this is a thought experiment and not a real idea yet
  • This is based on a tool that the FED uses, and that is paying interest on reserves. The FED will tell anyone who deposits with them, if you deposit with us we will pay you interest on the reserve. This will discourage the money to be in circulation. The way FED gets the money for the interest is through securities
  • Publius adds that everyone wants access to the FED window, and the only way to get access is by being your own bank. Beanstalk already allows you to get access to the interest rate for depositing this is the Silo.
  • In Beanstalk's case what if we have a new branch of the Silo where you will get paid a fixed interest rate at the end of the year with some conditions. Beanstalk would get this interest from buying back bonds at purchase price when Beanstalk is above peg.
  • Publius thinks that this does not make sense, the FED is very complicated and Publius thinks this could be an abstraction. They add that they do not like the idea of Beanstalk holding Pods for yield because Beanstalk can mint whenever they want

How would a fork of Beanstalk work?

  • Publius thinks what you would expect everyone would have to vote or select a system to choose a version. The interesting part would be what happens to people who do not vote. Publius thinks the Eth DAO hack would be a good example of this happening, but this is an L1 and they are unsure how to make the best forking mechanism within the EVM

Is Bean being off-peg a concern?

  • Publius says concern is an opinion, Beanstalk has ways to react to a de peg. Publius' opinion on this is in not a real concern to them since this is not as serious as previous de-pegs. It is a problem that people are not buying Soil, but Beanstalk is reacting by increasing the Weather

Transcript

how's it going Publius it's going mod how are you I don't really have my voice otherwise uh nothing to complain about you said you don't have your voice yeah I apologize for that okay we can hear you one but uh hope for a speedy recovery nevertheless all right well as long as I'm loud and clear and understandable then we're ready to go yeah and person says they miss the robot voice or The Voice modulated all right to those with us um feel free to drop your questions at the Town Hall chapter even better join us on stage I'm gonna give it some time see you know folks want to gather some thoughts or questions um and you know we can discuss them or to answer them and we'll start with with Hattie Smith where they ask when was there any updates on Wells so no real update on the well timing but do feel like uh from an infrastructure perspective things are getting much closer to Wells or Wells are getting closer to being ready for audit so a lot of what's Happening across being stock farms and what Publius is working on uh for really December uh and halborn is also working on is dramatically improving the documentation uh in the contracts and around Beanstalk such that when things that are as complex as Wells are implemented and audited and published hopefully the standards of documentation that have been put in place over the next month let's call it will be sufficient such that everyone involved in the process uh understands exactly what the code is supposed to do and not do and hopefully that will create a safe environment for the deployment of wells and pumps and aqueducts which are going to be collectively very complex codes so at a high level feel like a lot of the groundwork for relatively timely and God willing safe deployment of Wells a lot of that work is currently being done and so hopefully in the in the beginning of q1 wells will be ready for audit and be ready for audit in a according to the the new and updated uh documentation standard such that uh everyone that reviews the code from the time that it's done until the time that it's pushed on chain or proposed as a bip uh it is able to get a really clear sense of exactly what all of it is supposed to do and again given the complexity of Wells pumps and aqueducts we feel like this is very important and should actually allow for things to start to run a lot more quickly come the new year okay and as a reminder when it comes to updates there is a bit bit 30 that's currently live um and this bit is to introduce the generalized Pipeline and a few other updates to to be in stock including um updating the sunrise reward and Harry see you with the little crying Emoji in the in the chat and so we'll just say that one thing that is actively being considered and trying to be scoped out is what it would look like to have a beanie well pump and an aqueduct ready to go uh for audit in the very beginning of the new year and then uh push back slightly the timeline for fully generalized Wells pumps and aqueducts but feel like given the the market circumstance that may be something worth Expediting slightly but uh not not exactly sure how much at the margin that will make a difference and so we'll evaluate that kind of and continue to optimize in real time but we're we're highly focused on getting a bean eat pool live as well in the next uh couple of months let's call it in a safe fashion but and this is I mean this is just an opinion don't really feel like at the margin you know each is gonna bottom out in the next four four to six weeks let's call it uh or or if it does it's like the marginal couple weeks it's hard to imagine really costing Beanstalk so with that said uh not that speculating on eth is really what we like to be doing during class the the reason for the comment is that we really do view doing everything in a secure or as secure fashion as possible as Paramount and uh hopefully very soon whether it's January February uh very very soon all of the the code for the beneath wells will be ready for audit and then separately it is worth noting that there is uh hopefully going to be a uh a slightly more thorough pre-publishing audit process both from halborn including the immunified Bounty program before bips are published uh etc etc such that even if the code is ready early in q1 it may not be until towards the middle of the quarter that things can actually be uh pushed on chain so we're still talking a couple of months for better or worse and therefore still working on this end as fast as possible uh to get that stuff ready but understand uh understand where the where the rush is coming from thank you Publius okay Publius I have a question of my own and that maybe we're revisiting a previous idea about you know um the different seeds for different Assets in Beanstalk and right now we're talking about lb tokens and Ambience and maybe I can start this with discussing the state of being soccer the state of Beanstalk is at right now so the price of Bean is a 97 cents or around around that the field or the temperature of the field is increasing in order you know to sell sell soil or attract uh on demand for soil and then one thing notably that's maybe not happening or participants elect not to do it is convert um so um we you know the converters or the depositors in The Silo can regain pack but they choose not to uh and maybe one of the things uh that's leading to that is the friction uh of uh you know having four C's and going to two seats so we go back again to that discussion and I wanted your thoughts on this is is this fiction really um a bug or is it a feature is this not can this not be looked at as a good thing that um the protocol is incentive is drawn in such a way that the positives prefer to hold their liquidity rather or they give some value to holding it rather than always regaining Peg it's definitely somewhere in between and words like bugs and features May may not do justice to the Nuance here which is what let's let's take the the perfect case what would Beanstalk want in a perfect world in theory Beanstalk would would have some optimal deviation from the tag both in terms of magnitude of the price deviation and in theory you could also think of time as the other axis so the the price movement from tag and the time that the deviations take and you can think of uh the magnitude of the price deviations the the order of magnitude of the time deviations these are these are perhaps that the primary things that Beanstalk would want to optimize around and changing the temperature and changing the seeds per bdv in a in a perfect world are probably functions of that data right so it's the not currently being stuck uses the the current price or the current Delta B uh the current debt level and the change in demand for soil but in theory at the price level and the debt level you could introduce not just magnitude but also time into the into the the calculus and at that point the question the the Nuance becomes more apparent which is that what is being optimized around or should be optimized around perhaps isn't just a price deviation but also the magnitude of the price deviations the time of the price deviations and uh similarly the magnitude of the debt level deviations of the time of them and once you get into those questions to be frank feel like the modeling uh necessary to figure out what are the appropriate changes for being stuck to make to the seeds for bdv and the temperature it becomes very complex very very quickly and therefore it's it's probably not going to all be implemented day one uh when the gate system is implemented somewhat obviously but the point is that if we think about that as the ideal then then the question becomes well what assuming that the seeds per bdv and the stock per bdv can be flexible what should they be functions of and perhaps they start to work like the temperature Works where there's basic limits to it and they change somewhat basically or stupidly Up and Down based on some input data like the price and the debt level uh raw data but perhaps uh the magnitude of the changes can become uh that they can be much more sophisticated depending on the the deviations from from the optimal equilibrium which again is the price to Peg and the debt level at its optimal level so uh it's a very interesting question to be frank the the upgrades for The Silo that will facilitate uh changing cheats for bdb that's that's still you know hopefully going to be ready in q1 and at that point in time then the hopefully that will be implemented in a sufficiently generalized way where then upgrading the the equations that are calculating the feeds for bdv uh that is a a much simpler Dev change and more of a complex economics question if that makes sense so that economics question remains totally unanswered from from our perspective as to what the right way to make those changes are in response to that data and uh it's definitely an interesting thing to think about and worthy of more study I think it's very interesting the idea of having seeds um you know float or change According to some some curve but there's maybe two questions here one is how do you see the Dao um or you know I guess the Dow coming into agreement on on what you know what that pricing would be and then maybe the second question is do you foresee multiple pools with different maybe seats functions so you'll have you know a bm3 curve uh multiple being three curve pools that follow different you know seed formulas let's say all approved by the dog so I think it's let's answer the second question first which is in the context of wells the providing liquidity in Wells is most closely effectively like an nft because each of the wells will be pretty customizable and so in practice the feeds per pdv will not be a function of the lp tokens themselves but likely be a function of the the base assets that are in the the like effectively the bdb of the assets and what what that what that looks like in the wells if you load up usdc or or some combination of known Bean assets is effectively the price at which you're willing to buy the beans app and the point is that everything gets normalized to bdv and at that point the only question is what is the seed per bdv and that function can be somewhat arbitrary logic but don't think that in reality it'll make sense to have multiple multiple seed for bdv functions for the same token because in practice the tokens that are going to be valued and have pdv functions are are going to be like the base assets that trade against uh beans and and practice the liquidity uh I mean maybe it's the same thing right if every frankly it's unclear exactly how that will work uh but probably probably not but again it may it may in practice be the same thing depending on who it's architect and and don't think we've gotten that far uh in the dev process that to give you an answer although maybe if Publius is here and they have an answer feel free to hop up but don't think they are um and then you want to remind me of your first question mod it was around how the Dow can go about setting those uh those values yeah that's a very interesting question uh I think it depends on what type of function is being used So currently the seeds per bdb are just fixed values so two seeds per bdb four seeds per bdb but if the concept is that they should be fluctuating uh based on some set of factors there's also a question of what should the ranges be so some LP tokens may be range bound relative to other LP tokens and then have the the lp tokens float According to some algorithm or it could be that the Dow is constantly re-voting in real time by allocating stocks somewhere to two seeds for bdv like just some seeds for bdv vote and maybe both things are in place where the the relative rates of seeds per B to be the rankings of tokens that may be voted on somehow by the Dow and as we've spoken about from a risk management perspective it may make the most sense to have the Dow set some sort of Target exposures so each token that that exists in these LP tokens uh usdc usdt die USD whatever are trading against beans the Dow can set certain uh risk thresholds or desired Target allocations to different currencies and the question that becomes I guess assuming it's implemented in that way how does the Dow vote on those Target allocations and how does the Dow vote on the the method bit of oscillation to Target those oscillations and in the in the former case feel like it's probably going to be something like a continuous vote uh where people can constantly update their or maybe it should be I should say and things will be but it probably should be some sort of continuous vote whereby all stockholders can can anytime they want re-update their optimal Silo allocation and then there's some cumulative average across all stockholders votes in real time that's what the system is targeting and in terms of the the method of oscillation of the seeds for bdb to Target those Silo allocations uh that will probably have to be set uh at a time and then updated via bip as opposed to something that's continuously being voted on by the Dow in the same way that currently the the temperature oscillation has a way that it works and has to be updated by a bip and isn't in real time changing although there is there's always ways to improve the system and maybe that's the way the oscillation mechanism also moves where people can change the Target magnitudes and times and yada yada all of that can in theory also be a continuous vote but would have to give more thought about what's the optimal way to to set that up from an incentive perspective sounds like a truly revamp silo new unimproved yeah so not sure how long it'll take to get all of this stuff up and running but hopefully hopefully Q you know I mean I was going to give a quarter but hopefully that's like the the main mission for 2023 collectively is we can figure out how this thing works in a Perpetual generalized fashion and then I think maybe along those lines one really interesting governance question that's related to this is uh around Forks where if the Dow disagrees on risk allocation or protocol rules or tokens to whitelist in what cases should there be a a fork in what cases should there not be a fork uh how would a fork actually work uh these are very interesting questions but uh probably something that's also worth considering as the the on-chain governance as we implemented so perhaps the the generalized Silo new version of The Silo that's relatively separate questions from the on-chain governance re-implementation uh but in some ways it's it's obviously related yeah okay terrible asks uh Publius if you can summarize maybe in layman terms what are the updates that are in bit30 so not sure if you're familiar with pipeline which is something that was published uh on chain a couple of weeks ago uh as part of the the root Paradox product launch but Paradox and do you excuse me not Paradox Pipeline and Depot are Standalone contracts where pipeline facilitates or allows for an arbitrary series of function calls in the evm and Depot supports wrapping calls to pipeline to load pipeline call Pipeline and then unload Pipeline and so in in practice Depot and pipeline work together to create the ability to perform arbitrary valid actions in the evm in a single transaction and that has the potential to improve the user experience in in the evm whereas currently you got to do a bunch of different transactions in theory from from from the functionally facilitated from Pipeline and Depot uh you can now do almost anything in a single transaction now div 30 in short raps uh the new pipeline uh in a new Depot facet which is a basically a mirror to the Standalone Depot contract which wraps pipeline so pipeline exists and what bib30 is in short uh is a an implementation of a new Depot facet that wraps pipeline now there's another substantive change unrelated to pipeline which is changing the sunrise base reward from 100 beans to 25 beans and the reason for that is that until the sunrise reward or the sunrise Improvement which is currently under audit is ready for proposal which will probably not be for at least another month uh the decrease of the base reward is likely to save be in stock something like 60 000 beans over the next month and in short it's not expected to have a a significant effect on the way the the time in which the sunrise function is called and again that's one of the reasons why a new Sunrise function is being implemented because the current one is so inefficient but it isn't sort of a short-term fix to save beans at the margin something like sixty thousand beats so uh those are the two main changes proposed in bip 30 and not sure exactly when it it it expires but I think it's in the next couple days yeah that's on December 8th and we're around 55 from quorum okay I'll give it a minute uh see if folks uh have questions or if they would like to 55 from Quorum meaning that we're not even halfway to quorum um I think we are more than halfway so we have 20 million votes yeah all right it's uh yeah participation during the bear Market has not been great and to some extent this is the the point around the forking which is how to handle non-votes how to handle votes maybe the introduction of Fords requires the introduction of no votes in addition to four votes uh whereas currently you can only vote for uh so lots of interesting questions there and perhaps while participation should be mandatory uh there's certainly a question as to people that disagree with changes and people that agree with changes there has to be a way for both parties to continue either together or separately without uh necessarily the complete destruction of the credit history of the protocol right so it's it seems like as it gets harder for changes to be implemented and the ossification of Beanstalk at the base layer is probably a good thing there is a question as to making it easy for small factions or even large factions to spin out into their own subset and then maybe over time rejoin back into the main or or an older version of Beanstalk so it's very interesting just open-ended question as to how that should work yeah and I think we I mean governance in general Lord um having showing a high turnout for voting is as a challenge we've discussed it and you know this is a parent also elsewhere in anywhere it's difficult to encourage or have you know voters vote even if it costs nothing okay put this I have a bit it's not really a question it's maybe more of a thought experiment um and I I may be uh confusing here a bit so bear with me all right um I'm thinking here of maybe a new tool or a way that that Beanstalk can use to let's say control the money supply or the or the supply supply of beans uh and a lot of this is let's say inspired by a tool that the FED uses so maybe I'll start with what the FED does and then how can we mimic or have something similar uh to that on you know on channel on Beanstalk and again I don't think this is a real idea it's more of you know I thought exercise and and let's see where this takes us so one way or one tool that the FED uses to control the minus Supply is is interest on reserves or paying interest on reserves and the way the way that the FED does it is um the FED would tell you know institutions or Banks or whatever that can deposit with the FED is you know if you depend if you deposit with us we will pay you interest uh on that reserves that you keep with us and that way that will discourage you know uh the money to be in circulation and it will be kept with with the with the with the Fed so hence you know interest on on Reserves uh the question then uh comes is where does the FED get this money to pay interest right um and the way the way the the FED is able to pay that interest is that the head the FED holds Securities which is issued you know by uh by the treasury or by the government and the interest that the FED receives from those uh Securities that they're holding is the interest that the FED uses uh then to pay you know the that interest on the reserves so far so far so good let's see maybe have how can we have something similar to that to that in Beanstalk and and here is here is my thinking for completion does the FED use the reserves to purchase treasuries that then they return the yield from the treasuries back to the holders of the reserves or does the FED separately hold treasuries and then return the yield from the treasuries that they own uh to the to the holders of the reserves in the Fed I'm not sure maybe I I I got confused as as you're saying can you repeat it again sure so the yield that the FED is passing on to the depositors of the reserve comes from the treasuries that the FED holds correct correct now is that yield from those treasuries uh are those treasuries purchased with the reserves or are the reserves held separately from the treasuries yeah so those those are separate um the way the when the FED needs to buy um let's say treasuries or Securities they can just print and and buy so they don't need to use reserves uh you know they don't need to use someone else's money to buy those securities so the FED is budget so so let's just all be on the same page the FED is minting uh money uh to buy minting dollars to buy treasuries they're holding treasuries and then passing on some of the yield from the treasuries to the depositors of the reserve in the in the FED but to some extent their separate operation correct that's because they used to do that and now they don't really do that anymore to control the interest rate but they still hold a lot of reserves so they still hold reserves that they can use and it accumulate interest typically this interest gets you know returned back to the to the to the government so you know they don't like make interest on it but they they can also they also use that yield nowadays to pay interest on you know reserves that are held by Banks so it's a more effective tool than buying um treasuries on the open market or to control interest on the open market instead of buying you know Bonds on the market what they do is they just tell the bank say deposit it with us and we'll pay you interest well it's not necessarily that it's more effective it's that in an environment where interest rates are already zero it's hard for the additional purchasing of treasuries to have an effect on interest rates without pushing things into negative interest rate territory right so it's not necessarily that the purchasing of the bonds is a is a weak tool it's that it seems to have been exhausted and the payment to the to the depositors of the reserve is a new or additional complementary or supplementary uh monetary policy tool to affect people's willingness to hold dollars and uh assets that qualify as reserves correct correct there are there are a few reasons on why it it is it is uh uh let's say a weaker tool um for other for other reasons but generally speaking the way that they end up now um just controlling the Federalist fundrait is through interesting Reserves yes okay so I guess we drifted a bit and you know for good reasons but the core idea is that one way for you to remove the money supply is to you know just pay interest on those who will deposit uh you know that that money that instead would be in circulation with you so let's think or one way maybe I'm thinking of how can Beanstalk you know do that and again I don't think it's necessarily a good idea but maybe we can come up maybe maybe just to jump in for a second feel like the the the point here is that everybody really wants access to the FED window right that if being your own bank in a world where the FED is the issuer of the Global Currency would basically be having your own account at the fed and getting access to whatever that yield on reserves that currently only select parties have access to and in beanstalk's case everyone already has that ability because they can deposit assets Into The Silo so not sure exactly where where you want to take this mod but almost feel like being stuck already implements that yes you're right and one way or one way they got around you know the idea that not everyone can deposit with with the FED is the overnight repurpose repurchase agreements so it's it's like a workaround around it uh but they do the same thing they be like okay we're gonna buy it overnight and then we'll sell it again tomorrow with interest but but anyways the the the the idea that we were taken from this is that the you know one way again for you to remove the money supply is just you know you pay interest um uh instead of having them having it no circulating you tell that you tell them bring it keep it with us and and we'll pay interest we moved to windsock and maybe that that will uh maybe make it more clear so what if we say that you know we have uh a new branch of the side or an additional or a separate side of and that cider tells you that we will pay you a fixed interest rate um at the end of the year um and you know maybe not at the end of the year at the end of the year with conditions so it goes on something like this deposit uh you know in that new Silo and lock it for one year let's say and you'll get I don't know like 10 or 15 or any any any arbitrary interested um and and the way the way that the uh The Silo then will be able to you know the question comes like again how how will you know Beanstalk be able to pay that uh that rate or where will it get the money to pay that interest from and and here is here's what I'm thinking what if the protocol um whenever the price is above one uh is able to buy back bonds at purchase price I'm gonna say a lot of things here which may be confusing but humor me or you know you know bear with me and bear with me so if the protocol is able to buy uh Pods at purchase price um so you know any user whenever they bought uh Pods at a certain interest rate they're able to buy back um or sell their pods um at you know at the amount that they bought it and only when when p is above one what happens then is that the protocol holds those bonds they don't burn them or do anything with them they they keep it with them and when you know when when those spots Harvest once one time for Harvest comes um then the protocol now has beans uh that they can use these beans and only then pay um you know that fixed interest or the interest that I said you know after one year we're gonna pay you that much does that make sense so far so the same way the FED hold Securities and those Securities pay interest green stock will have pods and when those pods mature it will have you know beans that is able then to use to pay interest I'm not sure by the way if you're if you're maybe talking problems but you're muted oh sorry Mom I was immuno now I don't remember what I would say um the I I think I'm with you uh and understand what you were saying but economically don't think that it it really makes sense and the the the reason for that is to some extent what what the FED has going on is very complicated and abstract and may be deliberately so uh or not but it certainly prevents uh it's an abstraction around what's actually going on so and to me it makes more sense to bifurcate the two things that you're talking about one is whether in certain instances it may make sense for Beanstalk to buy back pods on the market and there's a lot of different ways to think about that uh one thing that may make sense is anytime pods are sold on the Pod Market or listed for less than the current temperature bean stock should be willing to buy them uh and burn them uh but don't really like the idea of Beanstalk holding the the pods as as some sort of form of yield in the form of new beans Beanstalk are just mint beans whenever it wants so it doesn't like the distribution of the beanments can be done in a much more elegant way than being dependent on how many pods being stuck has been able to buy on the secondary if that makes sense so it's like it becomes an abstraction and it actually prevents being stuck from acting in the most optimal way so to me it makes much more sense to keep the the treatment of PODS even if Beanstalk is starting to act on the secondary Market totally separate from the payment of yield to The Silo at least in my opinion no I think I think I I do agree um I besides the complexity um as well I'm just not sure if you know this new facility will be attractive anyways um but you know even even if it is there is there's a lot of a lot of complexity uh in it as you said okay um that's that's all from my end and I think we're at the end of the Town Hall actually we are not okay we have a few questions here so guy asks and they're going back to the idea of you know the forking or if the situation where Dao members you know disagree let's say and they want to Fork so a guy asks how could that work even in theory given that beans derive their value from the assets the Beanstalk can't meant I don't really know what that means yeah I think what they're saying is you know let's say right now we have been three curve and then we Fork who gets the three curve because you can't Fork a three curve so there's really a couple different parties in the system there's potholders depositors and fertilizer holders or Sprout holders and what you what you'd expect is for for a bib to be specified whether it is a fork like a hard fork or not in which case if there's no hard Fork it probably is okay to still have the four votes only but if it is going to be a hard Fork then you probably need a second class or a third class of votes introduced where it's a no vote is neutral a four vote is a vote four and a no vote is a vote to to keep the current system and think that in the case of a hard Fork everyone would have to vote or if not vote uh select opt into a system and in practice that is voting uh whereby all of the deposits associated with the stock and in the world where stock is liquid not clear exactly how that works um I'd have to choose a version similarly the Sprouts would have to choose a version and the pods would have to choose a version in the case where you don't vote that is is really the most interesting question whether your value gets split whether you retain value on both chains uh very unclear because then there's an incentive not to vote at all uh yeah very very very interesting question in some value you can't keep on both versions obviously do you know what are you aware of a protocol or something similar that happened and they continue in different paths I guess there are a few examples but can you think of one that is similar maybe um to our situation or one that to look for inspiration when it comes to something like that but hey they did it the good way or the right way and others maybe they did not well I feel like the eve to Dow hack was really probably the best example that comes to mind uh maybe Bitcoin cash with the Bitcoin Block Wars but both of those are l1s and so the question kind of becomes around how to create the most decentralized forking mechanism within the evm and as we've seen with with the the latest eat fork or the hard Fork to go to proof of stake the the centralized issuers of value on chain and ended up really being the deciding factor on where value was pertained and feel like a good decentralized governance mechanism with with forking within the evm should facilitate people to choose for accounts to choose uh in a much more decentralized fashion than at the top down aversion being selected so uh there's a lot of opportunity here to make radical improvements to current governance but there's also a lot of inspiration to be taken from uh how current l1s work Okay Tyler B asks and and Safi and guy let me know if this answered your questions if it wasn't we can expand mode on the forking question tylerby asks Bean has been off pack for a while is that a concern nobody seems to be buying sword right now is that a problem for the protocol and if that's the case then do you do you think there are things that we can do to improve the state of the install so these are hard questions to answer on the one hand concern is really a an opinion uh Beanstalk has autonomous ways to respond to its conditions uh concern angst any sort of emotion uh is not part of the Beanstalk equation uh if you're asking what we think Beanstalk has experienced much more significant deviations from peg in terms of magnitude uh and time at least so far in being stocks history and therefore it this doesn't seem particularly out of the ordinary obviously there's no way to know uh but with that said there's also not too many beans that actually exist such that there is some floor price to the to beans right now and frankly the you know it's hard to speak more substantively about that because don't want to say everything's great when things are off Peg and even when things are unpacked don't feel it's appropriate to say things are great it's there are lots of concerns and lots of things that can be improved and the the short-term deviations are are evidence of what may be working and not working but beyond that try not to get too focused on the short term uh with regards to the question around is it a problem that no one's buying soil in practice yes it is a problem and Beanstalk isn't responding to that problem by raising the temperature uh we would argue that and in response to your to your to your third question if that is the case what do you think we should do to improve the state of being stock feel like the the wells uh is something that a lot of people are waiting for uh but that won't necessarily contribute to Peg maintenance be like Silo V3 with a gauge system even if it's a rough gauge system that's probably the next big thing that will have a dramatic effect on Peg maintenance uh it and and further improve the economics of being stuck so that's probably q1 Q2 and in the meantime don't really anticipate a dramatic Improvement uh or or decrease in in performance from from the protocol but at this point hard to do much other than just keep building and there's a lot to build I also think it's interesting that there's a lot of if you want to call it gunpowder to get back to Peg but this it seems to be that this is now by choice um cider depositors or you know billion holders they choose or you know they're happy maybe with maybe not happy about content let's say with with the current Tech or price that's interesting okay we are at the end of the Town Hall uh chat let's give you let's maybe give it a minute and see if we have more questions okay thank you all for joining us today and as a reminder a bit 30 um is currently live for voting so if you if you didn't um please participate or vote uh Publius thank you for your time and we'll see you all next week