đź“–

Beanstalk University Class #45

Date
October 4, 2022
Timestamps

• 0:00 Intro • 0:12 What is the oracle problem for the AMM? And how is Publius approaching this problem? • 3:49 Is the source of the price taken into consideration? • 6:40 Someone is buying less than 1 soil per season to slow the increase of the temperature. Is this an inefficiency? • 8:51 Should unripe assets still receive seigniorage? • 13:10 Weighted voting discussion • 18:20 Bean bribes • 20:00 Rebalancing Seeds for Unripe assets • 22:20 Why treat Unripe assets differently than Ripe assets • 26:13 When will the Wells BIP be proposed? • 27:11 Will Root buy any Soil? • 28:17 When will there be a new roadmap? • 30:48 Business ideas • 37:55 Why has on-chain betting not taken off for other protocols? • 42:54 Will the prediction market draw from deposited liquidity from the silo or will it come from new deposits into the silo through the backend from a protocol? • 44:22 Publius’ thoughts on deploying code as fast as possible • 48:27 What happens if the BIPs do not pass? • 52:08 Closing thoughts

Type
Beanstalk University

Recordings

Notes

What is the oracle problem for the AMM? And how is Publius approaching this problem?

  • In the post-Ethereum Merge world, making an on-chain oracle that is resistant to multi-block MEV is non-trivial
  • Current deltaB is calculated with a basic TWAP and can be manipulated by multi-block MEV
  • A lot of research is being done on ways to measure the price on-chain
  • Trying to make a gas-efficient, easy-to-use, open-source oracle is very difficult
  • In order to make the on-chain oracle properly, such that this can be used on a variety of things, it is best to get it done right now so that in the future, everything can run on these oracles

Is the source of the price taken into consideration?

  • Yes, the hope is to have something similar to the original Beanstalk oracle, where everything is priced off of the ratio of Ether trading against other stablecoins
  • The idea is to have many stablecoins trading againstEther in Wells to support this
  • The liquidity of the Wells having an effect on the oracle is still being considered
  • Unsure if the depth of the well makes a significant difference

Someone is buying less than 1 Soil per season to slow the increase of the temperature. Is this an inefficiency?

  • Yes, definitely an inefficiency
  • Publius does not think this is a problem per say but thinks it is a bit of an issue that one party has an effect on what Beanstalk is doing

Should Unripe assets still receive seigniorage?

  • In general, Publius prefers to comment on things like this if there is specific logic. Also not too sure where the sentiment is coming from, and they do not spend too much time on this.
  • There is some thinking that current unvested liquidity is owned by the FERT holders. Publius thinks that is ridiculous, FERT holders do not own the USDC they used to purchase the debt.
  • When you purchase debt in any instance, you own the debt, not the capital used to purchase the debt.

What if we added a weighted vote system, where everyone starts at 100% and then depending on how often you vote your voting power reduces? If you come back and vote again you go back to 100% of your voting power

  • The governance system for Beanstalk was designed so that Beanstalk is very hard to change. This is very healthy for it to be hard to change Beanstalk.
  • When there are 2 different parties that have different ideas there will be a fork in L1. This is not currently the case for Beanstalk, but maybe it makes more sense to adopt this model. There would be competition between the two forks.
  • At the end of the day, it’s probably better to stay as a single unit. This is an important discussion and should be discussed more. Unsure what is the best route for the DAO.
  • Maybe it makes sense in the future, as more people do not vote, to change an Abstain to count as a For vote.
  • A lot can be done to improve Beanstalk governance.
  • Publius’ thoughts on Beanstalk bribes (something similar to Curve bribes)
    • At the end of the day, there is nothing that can be done to prevent a market like this from arising. There's a good chance that there will be a market for Stalk to be used in certain BIPs. This does not need to be a focus in the Beanstalk governance. The Beanstalk DAO just needs to be aware that this can happen.

Rebalancing Seeds for Unripe assets

  • From Publius’ perspective, it does not make sense to remove seeds from Unripe assets completely. It does make sense to lower the amount of seeds per Unripe LP. It would require all of the deposits stored on-chain, there is a cost to get this done. Publius does not plan on spending time on this over the next couple of weeks, but if someone else wants to that would be good.

Why treat Unripe assets differently than Ripe assets?

  • The general concept is this is a rough and short-term step prior to an on-chain gauge system where seeds per BDV change automatically. Currently, there are a lot of Unripe assets compared to Ripe assets. There is friction around Converting.

When will the Wells BIP be proposed?

  • This is the main focus for Publius right now. Q4 is still the goal.

Will Root be buying soil when it launches?

  • MisterManifold is not at the meeting but there is no comment on how Root will use their capital.

When will there be a new roadmap?

  • Beanstalk is at the point where it is clear what needs to be done, but there are a lot of open ideas on what needs to be done. At some point, Publius will publish what they think needs to be done.

Business built on top of Beanstalk

  • ROSCA (Rotating saving and credit association)
    • Overall the idea is if there is 10 people with 1,000 dollars they send that money to someone, every month this keeps going until the duration expires
    • Could commit funds to the pool. This is cool, but unsure if this adds utility on top of Beanstalk. This is normally done in smaller communities.
  • Pool together for the Silo
    • Group of Farmers come together and agree one person will win all of the seigniorage earned between all accounts
    • Cool idea and it is fun but does not add real utility to Beanstalk
  • NFT marketplace
    • You lock the capital you are bidding with. If you are using Silo Deposits then you still get seigniorage during the bidding process.
    • Root is working on a fork of Seaport. Root is also working on on-chain storing of orders that would include EIP-721.

Why do you think on-chain betting hasn’t taken off with other protocols?

  • You have non-competitive carrying costs for on-chain assets. On-chain betting markets cannot compete with off-chain businesses.
  • When collecting Bean seigniorage there is no longer the carrying cost.
  • If you build generalized tech and is integrated with the silo you will solve a lot of issues with carrying costs
  • There are a couple of issues that face DeFi right now, scalability and transaction fees are the easy ones. Transaction ordering fairness is a harder issue. If there is a way in a trustless fashion to order transitions by when the majority of nodes receive the transaction could take away a lot of the impermanent loss for providing liquidity.

Will prediction market draw from deposited liquidity from the silo or will it come from new deposits into the silo through the backend from a protocol?

  • Both, so people who have Deposits can use them in the prediction market, and other protocols can use the markets as well
  • Something that is almost ready for audit is the generalized pipeline. Using the pipeline, other protocols can use the farm to interact with other protocols.

Publius’ thoughts on deploying code as fast as possible

  • There is excitement to get new code published as fast as possible, but from an ethos perspective, it makes more sense to move slowly and build things that will last.
  • Building things that are generalized and gas-efficient is not easy. There are a lot of other things that are needed to get to the point where it's obvious for other protocols to use Beans and Beanstalk.
  • The pace of development is much better than pre-exploit and it's a much leaner team. Rome was not built in a day.

What happens if the BIPs do not pass?

  • We do not know, depends on what the BIP is. It is never the end if a BIP that doesn’t pass.
  • If the DAO never passes another BIP, Beanstalk will probably not make it. Maybe at this point, it would make sense to fork. Nobody knows how this will play out.
  • The governance might be a bigger question than the economics of Beanstalk. These are really good data points for the future.

Transcript

how are you Publius doing quite well mod how are you thanks a lot very well here all right we can kick off this class with a question from Bacchus and he asks two questions we'll start with the first one um can you describe the Oracle problem that you're working on preparation for the amm and how are you approaching this problem sure so the the starting point of the problem is that in the post-merge world constructing an on-chain oracle that is resistant to multi-block Mev is non-trivial that's the starting point and so uh the current Delta B from the bean 3 curve pool is calculated with a a basic t-wop and in store that is not resistant to multi-block Mev now Beyond just multi-block Mev the goal of building an on-chain oracle where the price from the Oracle is exclusively a function of on-chain data is to make the Oracle or oracles resistant to as much different as many different types of manipulation as possible and so when it comes to what's the the hold up well there's a lot of research being done into the different types of ways to measure the price and not just the different ways to measure them for example should use an arithmetic mean should you use a geometric mean what's the best way to store the data is it is a t-wop better than an EMA type of Oracle there's lots of questions that were there's a lot of research being done into what are the different types of oracles that can be implemented in a relatively gas efficient Fashion on chain and then what types of manipulation are each of those oracles resistant to and then it's a question of well can you construct well then there's two questions the next question is can you construct gas efficient on-chain oracles that are pretty flexible such that other protocol can also use these on-chain Oracles in a permissionless fashion so they're really easy for others to use as well and they're not just hard-coded oracles for specific uses but they're more generalized can that be done in a gas efficient fashion and then sort of the ultimate question is how do you design an aggregate Oracle such that the the the read an on-chain read that is constructed from perhaps an aggregate of a variety of different Oracles that are resistant to different types of manipulation that ultimately you can get some sort of value that is derived exclusively from Unchained data in a gas efficient fashion that is generally manipulation resistant uh because of the fact that it is actually comprised of a variety of different Oracles that are each individually resistant to various types of manipulation so the the short answer is uh in order to try to get the on-chain Oracle is right uh such that this can be used on a variety of different things going forward we think it makes sense to try to do most of the homework and leg work now and get the oracles done right now such that uh in the future everything else can just start to run on top of these oracles assuming that they they turn out to be generally manipulation resistant so that's that's the problem in a nutshell as the source of the price also taken into consideration and by that I mean for instance when we had a bin if pool we used to read the usdc pool as a reference is that taken into consideration where are you reading or referencing the price as well yes so at the end of the day the hope is to have a similar to the way that the original Beanstalk Oracle was constructed where you've got some lag to ethereum where you're pricing ethereum in dollars and then you can price everything against ethereum the hope is to have at some point uh and if usdc and an East usdt and an eth die maybe an e to LUSD lots of different pairs trading in Wells uh with with very low or zero fees probably zero fees the question is whether or not The Silo needs to incentivize liquidity in those pools even though they don't have bean exposure such that Beanstalk can derive a relatively manipulation resistant price for ethereum and then everything else can be derived off of that so there is still a a fundamental question of where to get the price of a dollar per se uh but but the hope is that if you have an on-chain oracle that is sufficiently generalized and resistant to General manipulation again not not really a well-defined term at this point but we're still in the research phase the hope is that you'll be able to do all of this without any single points of of centralization or potential censorship and if we're considering multiple sources within the depth or the size of these pools also uh play you know at all into into the article that is certainly one thing that's being looked into uh in in practice there's actually likely going to be a variety of different styles of Oracle uh it depth is less meaningful when it comes to taking an immediate price uh but it is more meaningful when trying to come up with liquidation prices for example so if these Wells are ultimately going to be used for cdps or other derivatives such that liquidation is required then the liquidation value of Any Given position in a well would certainly be a function of depth so figuring out how to factor depth into these oracles is another part of the problem yeah and I see I mean you've mentioned at least four or five things that require a lot of a lot of depth or a lot of research into it um and I just wanted to highlight how you know complex this this article problem or um or the article in general it is and we look forward to tackling all of this and seeing it eventually hopefully coming out in Q4 of this year all right the second question from Bacchus is he he asks and he says there seems to be somebody purchasing an negligible amount of soil every season so that the temperature rises by one percent instead of three percent and that is slowing down the price Discovery you know for soil doesn't this indicate a problem with the soil demand measurement since you know less than one being so on when Delta B is around 350 000 is being considered medium demand wouldn't be better to use you know something else and he proposes solution that is a gradient where you look into the amount of soil that was unsold season over season yes this is clearly in in inefficiency at death in the measurement for soil and or measurement of demand for soil and I think the the grading idea is certainly interesting when we hadn't considered uh something that was more of a quick fix to this would be something like if less than half of the soil is not sown then the weather continues to go up uh but there's there's a couple different ways to try to get around this but uh generally yeah this is this is certainly an efficiency in the measurement for demand for soil that's on display here do you think this is in general problematic so what if the Press Discovery takes time um you know for it for it to be if it's one percent instead of three percent and it takes longer is is this a problem in general well it's not a problem per se in general Beanstalk isn't in a rush to return the bean price to the peg at any given time but nonetheless that's a different thing than currently minimal beans or season and a single entity can significantly affect the way that Beanstalk is changing its temperature and so from our perspective they're really two separate questions one is what should Beanstalk be changing the temperature based on the data and then the second question is how to measure the data in order to answer the form of question as accurately as possible but this seems to be a problem with the latter question which is that the measure of demand for soil seemed to be pretty inaccurate at the moment all right the second question comes um from from terribly um and that may be a little bit of the same idea or the same line of thinking that NASDAQ dropped in the uh in the ideas uh Channel and and that is you know should all uh participants still receive senior Rich so let's read the question hindsight is 20 or 20. and I believe it of being on the protocol but I'm starting to question how good that that was to Holders before exploit specifically pod holders taking no haircuts and unripe holders still receiving senior rich do you think that all participants you know are to receive um being senior rich or not and now Jack's idea was that all participants you know should not receive being synerg until I'm actually not sure until one but in general he thinks that you know don't they shouldn't be receiving being senior rich well there's a couple things one in general you know we'd prefer to comment on things like this if there's reasons for it if that makes sense like the question is just they're raising whether or not the potholders taking no haircuts and unripe holders still receiving teenage is a good idea I think it's easier to respond to specific logic than just to make a a high level statement about this is good or this is bad uh not also not exactly sure where the sentiment is coming from uh from our perspective this isn't something that we give much thought to think that the that the protocol is in a pretty healthy spot moving forward and don't not really focused on the past at all so just haven't really haven't thought about it and the fact that there's not a lot of uh reasoning or points specifically to address in this question makes it a little hard to to address specifically but from our perspective uh you know nothing really to say on this front okay maybe I can build up a little bit on that and I think there is some sort of thinking on you know the current liquidity that is uh on uh that is invested let's say uh or unvested which are unripe assets um who owns it on something that you know those who purchase fertilizers they're the ones who own it uh I'm not I'm not the the unripe holders well that's ridiculous that is ridiculous so you know it's there's there's I mean there's there's good there's good ideas and there's bad ideas the idea that the people that purchase the fertilizer still own the usdc that they use to purchase the fertilizer is ridiculous so uh yeah that that's an easy one to to substantively respond to that's not that's like a I I don't even know how to respond to certain things okay all right maybe we can move a little bit to some questions about uh governance and reminding everyone there are five proposals that are right now about maybe just to harp on that a little bit when you purchase debt in general any from anyone in any case whether it's a protocol whether it's a bank you now own the debt you do not still own the capital that you use to purchase the debt the concept that you own the debt the bond whatever you want to call it and still own the capital it's just ridiculous agreed on the owners right now are the unripe holders given that they are the ones who issued that that and fertilizer was a debt issuance the the the way that the usdc was going to be used from the fertilizer sales was very clear uh so the concept that I mean it's just ridiculous all right we move we moved to some governance uh questions um and again reminding everyone that we have five uh current proposals that are out there for voting um and we can we can ask some questions and I guess this comes back again you know to maybe voter voter fatigue and there are some ideas on how to maybe counter that I'm just gonna check who asked that was Chris so Chris proposes or or thinks that you know what if we add a weighted vote system where everyone starts at 100 and then depending on you know how often you vote your vote voting power reduces and then if you come back and you're voting again you you go back again to you know 100 of your voting power so let's say you know you have uh 100 100 beans they give you 100 stock you don't vote you know 10 times in a row so now only 50 uh of your 100 stock are eligible for voting if you vote back again you get back again all of your 100 100 stock and and the idea is that this brings down you know the Quorum uh needed to passwords well first off the governance system for Beanstalk was designed and I know at this point it's easy to laugh at because it was ultimately attacked it was designed such that Beanstalk is very difficult to change if the goal is for Beanstalk to be the issuer of money it cannot be that it's easy to change the nature of that money or to Mint arbitrarily new amounts of that money so in general we think it's probably better than not that it's hard to pass bips and the fact that there's friction and a close vote it's very healthy from our perspective it should not be that uh it's it's it's easy to change Beanstalk now with that said there really is something unique about the nature of Beanstalk as a dow because it does hold value in it and there is some some aspect of if you look at ethereum for example when there's a a descent when there are two different parties that have different ideas for how the protocol should proceed there's a fork very often and the result is that there's a fragmentation of value and there's a split and in the case of Beanstalk the goal is really as much as possible to prevent a split now at the end of the day maybe it makes sense for for the governance system to be a little bit closer to an L1 system where you have bean Forks that arise based on participation in depths and in doing so you can have the competition between the two models and therefore you can have some sort of unity amongst the people to continue to use a given version of Beanstalk but think that it's probably better to have the Dow remain a single Collective and and and try to try to implement things as a single unit as opposed to constantly forking but this is kind of a theoretical discussion that I think could be fleshed out a little bit more and as the governance system around Beanstalk increases in sophistication for example there may be uh delegation that's added at some point uh it's unclear whether it's unclear what the best way to to have the Dow run it is particularly when there are close votes and the other thing is well you you may have particularly as Beanstalk grows in regular use and you have less active members in the Dow maybe it is that that you do need to vote against propositions as opposed to of abstain and Counting as a vote against in the if we go out to where we started answering this question about how it's important that it's hard for Beanstalk to change that's why it it currently abstentions are counted as dissenting votes but perhaps there's a significant portion of the Dow that is simply not engaged in voting therefore it's very hard to actually get to a 50 Quorum and if we go back to how when an L1 splits even your passive users they can they they just hold both of the forks and then you're slightly more active participants they can sell one fork for the other there is there is something to be said for down members being able to more actively assert what how did like be in stock to change but it really does need to be balanced against Beanstalk changing too much or too quickly or too easily so not sure that this is a particularly constructive answer but a lot can a lot can be done to further improve be in stock governance but not sure we agree that that there's there is necessarily A inherent problem per se okay the other proposal mentioned uh is maybe something that we discussed before which is being bribes or bribing you know people to vote on governance proposals and the question is what do you think about that would you elaborate what that means so maybe something similar um to how curve uh Works where you know um there's a proposal out there and and we allow people to bribe or pay stockholders in order to vote you know or sway their votes one way or another maybe it becomes an incentive for them to also like vote so at the end of the day vitalik's written about this there's nothing that can really be done to prevent such a mark from arising for using governance tokens and therefore it's it's probably inevitable that there becomes some sort of market for stock particularly to be used in certain depths uh but not sure that that needs to be a focus of the Beanstalk governance system as much as just a consideration that that is likely to exist in some capacity and therefore the governance system needs to be aware of it and resistant to as resistant as possible to manipulation that can come from uh people lending out their voting power okay um the next the next question is we we go back and visit an idea from last that was brought up last week by Bacchus as well which is rebalancing seeds for unripe assets and and the the thought last week was what if we remove them completely or change them basically you know for for Android holders and there has been some some discussion uh going back and forth on it and probably is this share their technical um um opinion or input as well um to that I'm not sure probably if you've followed up through it but I wanted to see if you have any ideas uh or any thoughts uh on on that proposal so from our perspective it certainly doesn't make sense to remove seeds entirely from unripe assets uh things that it's generally beneficial to to retain the Integrity of the stock system as closely as possible because of its efficacy from a an incentive perspective thus far at least and not sure that getting rid of the seeds for unripe assets is really going to help Beanstalk in any way what does seem to be reasonable is potentially lowering the seeds for the unripe lp uh as opposed to raising the beans for the unripe lp to make them closer together don't really think it makes sense for the unripe beans to have a higher seeds for bdb than than normal beans that seems weird so think that the the most reasonable way to do this would be to lower the the seeds per unripe LP now that would require it's just not the most trivial thing to do at last class we spoke that it was probably pretty trivial it is generally trivial but it would require uh an update to all of the deposits that are stored on chain that are unripe LP that have a a bdv uh unripe LP seed ratio four that would have to be lowered to three so there is some cost associated with doing that uh but it could certainly be done so from our perspective if someone wanted to go ahead and try to implement that we'd obviously be as always willing to help out but uh not sure that's uh what we intend to spend our time on over the next couple weeks but certainly makes sense uh for someone to implement so probably I have two questions um and the first is why treat unripe assets differently from from Ripe assets why why do Android LP receive less um than right points and I'll ask I'll ask a second question after that after the first I think I lost you there for a minute the Wi-Fi can you hear me now I can't hear you now sorry the Wi-Fi went out where did I where did I lose you um just at the end of the question so you can answer this from the beginning and remind me the question sorry mod yeah what white treat Android assets differently from right points so why why should unwrapped assets receive less seeds you know than than new new deposits or dry points sure so the the general concept is that this is a rough and short like a short term rough intermediate step prior to the implementation of an on-chain gauge system uh where you have some sort of automatically adjusting seeds per bdv and the the reason to implement something in the short term even though generally we're not fans of that is just because of the complexity of upgrading Silo to a gauge system where you have some sort of adjusting seats per bdb and currently you have a significant amount of unripe LP and unripe beans relative to ripe Alpine ripe beans and it seems like there's some friction around converting unripe LP to unripe beans I guess in theory there's also flux around converting LP to beans uh but the outsized amount of unripe acids makes it more of a problem there now there might be an argument I think is what you're implying mod to change the seeds for bdb to three for each of the lp tokens uh unripe and ripe and not sure that that's a bad idea either although it's less obviously helpful to be in stock given the circumstances foreign this is something to consider even after implementing the gauge system which is when do we have a difference between seeds between LP and Boons so the idea uh with for more seeds for LP LPS versus Bean holders is that you know Beanstalk wants to incentivize or or move towards a higher liquidity in the side or unbean stock so why not only have the difference when the price of being is above one but when it's below one there is no difference in seeds between them so you know I am an LP holder I have four seeds when the price is above one now I only have two seats when it goes back below one it goes back to four seats oh sorry when it goes back above one then you know I go back again to four seats does that make sense yeah that makes perfect sense uh certainly something that should be considered as the stock system is uh the gauge system for stock is designed it makes a lot of sense okay all right um I'm at the end of the questions uh that I've picked up from from the past week maybe we can give it a minute or two for others uh to have any other questions uh from to this uh the current discussion or you know if you have other ones that that weren't addressed and you didn't mention them foreign that remains to be Q4 but probably is fifth if you have an update from your end uh we're from our perspective that's really the main focus so trying to get that ready for audit as soon as possible but are still in the the research phase so it's the beginning of Q4 time is moving pretty slowly we would say right being stock was replanted less than two months ago I feel like there's a lot of stuff happening at this point so don't think it's unreasonable to try to have that bip proposed by the end of the year I think that's a reasonable goal but you know no promises okay the second question comes from meow meow and he asks do we know if fruit will be buying up any soil um when it launches Mr manifold is not with us but generally speaking the answer has answered is there is no comment on how root will will use their their capital and Publius again if you have any anything from your hand please let us know I was going to say the same that uh I generally you know think manifold is not inclined to disclose how rude is managing their assets okay I'll give it um give it some time as again if others have questions before I move to to something else let's see Cthulhu typing so we'll wait and take that question we have a question from previous and that is when is there going to be a new roadmap so a couple people reached out to us recently and were wondering when if ever there's going to be an updated road map and thought that it would be reasonable to talk about it a little bit here so in general at this point think Beanstalk is at the point where there's very clear things that need to get done but also there's a lot of open ideas that anyone can present what needs to get done so from our perspective we think that it probably it probably makes sense and we'll we'll try to coordinate with Beanstalk farms and coordinate with uh I mean anyone that's interested but at some point we will probably try to publish uh sort of where we see things going and what we think should be built or could be built and try to articulate it as best as possible I think we're still just internally we're very hesitant to put stuff out there when it feels like it's still just changing so much and other than sort of the obvious immediate things that are the next six to 12 months of work let's call it that have already been well laid out were a little bit hesitant to rush into saying what we think are the the the the big things that need to get worked on and how to do them so we're at least on our end we're not in a rush to put out a road map but it's something that we we find that we naturally are just constantly working on because we're thinking about being stuck all the time and are trying our best to just write things down more and more so at some point we hope to publish something or work with Beanstalk Farms to publish something but still not quite there yet but uh uh enough people had reached out to us about this that we felt uh it would be reasonable to mention thank you for that definitely is a question that is um constantly asked and look forward to to that roadmap being out and casula had some kind words uh about the class and he said that now he can see how better to build um you know things on top of Beanstalk and we definitely look forward to that and if you have any ideas you come up to station and and say them or bring them up our men write them in the Beanstalk ideas channels as well with that maybe we can move to to something else previous and that is the business ideas channel uh that is you know recently uh has been there and we had a few uh ideas in there and I thought that maybe we can use some time of today's class to to discuss some of them you know just on a light spirited way um how do we think you know what are these ideas and maybe how can they benefit being stock let's say um in general starting off with one from Safi and that is about um rotating savings and Credit Association not sure if you're familiar with it probably is but generally speaking the idea of it is that let's say we have 10 people I'm sorry about that let's say we have 10 people and each one has a thousand dollars so these 10 people come together and every month they send that money to someone and said you know instead of having did any any loans or any interest in it and then every month you just pass it and keep on giving it you know to someone to someone else until the end until the end of the duration so 10 people 10 months every month someone receives 10 000 dollars if it's a thousand each and just radiates in in that in that way or another so it's like come together and form your own bank and you know Supply people or provide people just based on internal trust amongst each other first of all does this make sense and then do you think this adds any any benefit to the Beanstalk ecosystem well I think you could implement it without trust in the sense that people can commit their deposits to a pool and therefore you can do it in a trustless fashion not sure how much utility there is to have this implemented at the moment but think that it's a cool it's cool and certainly not going to poo poo it as an idea to implement and use beans or deposits to facilitate that uh the rosca but uh don't think it's the highest leverage thing to build on top of Beanstalk at the moment yeah and I think something with that generally is is scalability it's typically done in like let's say smaller communities or more of the ones that are uh you know less privileged let's say community communities that you would they would come together and help help each other instead of having to deal you know with whether and seeking or or with with banks that charge interest rates okay the second one is pulled together but for The Silo so a group of solid capacitors come together and they'd be like hey one of us is going to win you know whatever um um senior rich is depos is accrued from all of our accounts yeah I think this is similar to the Roscoe which is that it's cool it's fun it's another thing to do with your beans but it's not really utility or it's not going to facilitate the adoption of beans or being stopped by businesses so if if the question is how to create real utility for beans think of the starting point is more uh derivatives and ways that businesses will be able to borrow and lend money to one another and manage their treasuries within Beanstalk in such a way such that they have the right exposure for their business so uh derivatives in a more sophisticated Financial uh defy ecosystem built on top of Beanstalk that's probably where to start as opposed to these I I don't want to call them games per se but they're more uh Z they're zero sum okay the last one that I wanted to discuss is uh from naljack and that is an nft Marketplace integration or maybe it can be native uh to being stuck but the idea is that typically when people that uh sorry not bad um when they did uh for an nft you lock you know your um the capital that you're bidding with something similar to even in the blood Marketplace when you're bidding you're you're locking you know that uh that bit of fuels so if we are using um if there's an integration with Beanstalk or you're using starter deposits to bid then while all of that bidding is happening or that duration is happening you're accruing uh senior Rich so the same of what root is doing but you know for nft Market this is just given that there are a lot of bits there and a lot of a lot of capital that it's locked so as we understand it the there's a couple things one is that root is working on a couple of different products the first is a I mean well not the first because they've already got bit 24 they've got the root token but one of the the next things that they're working on is we understand it is a fork of Seaport and Seaport is generally a way for uh two parties to reach an agreement to exchange basically arbitrary assets and that includes nfts so not sure on the pseudo swap uh style of it although don't think that's excluded based on the way that it's being implemented it should be sufficiently generalized but the concept is that that should already that should already be a part of the seaport Fork but that is with off-chain orders now another question is how to have an nft marketplace with on-train orders and for what it's worth uh I think that and maybe here I'm Miss speaking but as I understand it root is also working on a similar a concept but with on-chain storing of orders and that that should probably Encompass an 721 tokens I would certainly expect it to Encompass 721 tokens but the question is whether it would do so in such a fashion that you can bid for a whole class of nfts and I don't think you would be excluded from that so it should probably that idea should probably already be in development because and I think this really speaks to building generalized Tech if the the tech that's built on Beanstalk really is uh the most generalized that it can be a lot of these use cases are covered by high quality generalized on-chain development so I think that a lot of this a lot of the nft marketplace ideas should already be in development as a subset of what root is working on to implement on chain betting okay thank you for that answer and that was the last idea that I wanted to discuss we can we can give it a few more minutes uh if anyone has any other question before in this class meow meow asks why do you think unchain betting hasn't taken off with other projects not enough liquidity or bad spread or other reasons onto embedding is a microcosm or the maybe we should say the problem facing on-chain betting or a microcosm of the problems facing defy in general which is that you have non-competitive carrying costs for on-chain assets so if I want to make a betting Market a prediction Market off chains versus on-chain on chain prediction markets businesses that are making those markets simply cannot compete because of the cost of capital because the cost of liquidity and therefore there's simply not enough liquidity so we we think that fundamentally Beanstalk is designed to solve that problem specifically and it creates a currency you you receive interest just for holding it and therefore the there is capital that there's no opportunity cost for using it within these predictions or any market so you're collecting the interest from being stock there's no longer an opportunity cost associated with uh the carry that you're potentially forgiving elsewhere uh or giving up elsewhere and I think that's really the cause or the Crux of the the problem the problems across across the board why is there no adoption of any of this Tech we think it's primarily carrying costs and so from our perspective prediction markets are just one of the things that should and will hopefully be built on top of Beanstalk and when we say on top of Beanstalk we really mean to support The Silo and potentially also the field because the silo isn't and it doesn't support it it supporting The Silo isn't there's no ERC standard for The Silo at the moment and therefore having technology that accepts deposits and allows for them to be used that's really the main difference so if if you can start to use your deposits in all of the current things that D5 has we think it it probably will start to get adopted and then to be perfectly Frank we're not interested in copying what other people are doing we're interested in building things that are way way better so we go back to you know what we were talking about with nasdaq's idea for this nft Marketplace if you build sufficiently generalized on-chain Tech it's going to cover a lot of the use cases that you want covered and then if it's integrated with Beanstalk already and integrated with the silo in particular that really should facilitate a wide variety of utility for beans and the use of D5 because now you don't have this liquidity problem so I think that root is hopefully going to be a proof of concept that lots of use cases that previously weren't profitable on chain uh now it actually is now with that optimistic thing said do think that there are a couple other real problems that face the face defy in general uh scalability is an easy one and transaction costs but the other one that I think we've started to really pay attention to more and more is transaction ordering fairness and in particular if you have some way such that in a trustless fashion there's some guarantee that transactions are going to be ordered based on when they were sent or or if not sent when uh most of the nodes in the network receive the transaction then that can actually take away a lot of the cost associated with slippage uh or impermanent loss might be a better way to say it uh for providing liquidity so those are maybe the the main problems as we see it there's the carry cost problem that's the main problem that Beanstalk was tackling then you've got the scalability problem which a variety of l2s and other other l1s are trying to tackle in a variety of different ways and then you've got the transaction ordering fairness or the fair transaction ordering and think that's a less research problem as we understand it there was a pretty good paper that we were directed to when we spoke to arbitrum recently put out by uh one of the founders of arbitrum or maybe the founder of arbitrary I'm not sure exactly and that seems to at least start the conversation around Fair transaction ordering but otherwise there's not too much that's uh that's been done on that front I think it's very important thank you for that answer and meow meow if you have any follow-up to that please type it in the tunnel chat and type heated will the prediction Market draw from deposited liquidity in the silo or would it be new deposits into The Silo on the back end from another protocol I think in theory you'd like both right so people that have deposits can obviously use those deposits however they'd like in the prediction Market but then as well you you'd like other protocols to be able to in a seamless fashion use root and so one of the things that we've we've been working on uh and and should hopefully be ready for audit very soon is a generalized implementation of the depot and the pipeline uh or pipelines now it's just one pipeline but the concept is that through the generalized pipeline uh other protocols should be able to use the farm to interact with other protocols and that would include Roots so in theory that would that would answer the second part of your question which is whether new deposits into The Silo from other protocols would be done on the back end that should all be facilitated by a generalized people and Pipeline and that that also should be ready for audit in the not too distant future okay let's give it one more minute and I see my was typing maybe a follow-up question yeah it's just it's just thanking so give it one more minute if any anyone else has another question yeah and maybe just although I don't know how helpful this is I appreciate I think we all appreciate that there's excitement to get new new code deployed and new products launched as soon as possible but we really do feel like from a an ethos perspective it's much better to move a little bit more slowly and build things that are going to last or even if they're not gonna last forever are going to be useful for a significant period of time and can be iterated on top of and Building Things in a sufficiently generalized and gas efficient fashion that that's the case isn't the easiest thing to do and do want to give a huge shout out to all the back end Engineers that are working on a ton of different stuff and if you take a look at the GitHub you can see all the different work that's being done uh the pull requests and and the different things that are being worked on there's a lot a lot of work just to get Beanstalk to a place where it's truly interoperable and the benefits of on-chain compost ability are fully leveraged and uh even though certain more more obvious features like uh the gauge system or the on-chain governance being implemented again or the wells are a little bit more in your face as uh things that are needed or desired we would just add that there's lots of other things that are also needed in order to get to a place where it's just an obvious decision for other protocols to use beans and or Beanstalk and from our perspective it now really is unrelated to the bear Market really now is the right time to be trying to do a lot of that work and think a lot of it's being done and being done at a a really commendable Pace by all the back end Engineers so shout out to them and uh you know this this perhaps is a little bit of a direct response to some of the uh the frustration that's been expressed by people that there's not a lot happening I don't think we agree with that at all so from our perspective the the the pace of development on and around Beanstalk is is orders of magnitude faster than it it was prior to the exploit and it's with a much leaner beam stock Farms team uh being Sprouts really starting to chug and and output lots of different stuff and Rome wasn't built in a day so uh we're very enthused by all the work that's being done and all of the development and just want to give a huge shout out as uh the the Beanstalk Farms Biff comes down to the wire and the bean sprout budget also seems like it's probably going to come down to the wire issue although it's doing better than the Beanstalk Farms pip uh that from our perspective we're we're thrilled with the work that everyone's doing and uh really appreciative so uh that's our two cents on the matter obviously uh you know the Dow has to vote on on on whether they think it makes sense to continue to allocate funding uh to being Sprout and Beanstalk Farms but I think there's a ton of good stuff happening and it probably would be a a shame if that development was uh decelerated in any way because of a funding uh funding issue so uh yeah I think enough said on that front but but this is Meaningful totally agreed and I guess can't complain from from a dial that you know puts you to a high standards and and you know which just pushes you I guess uh to get more and more and speaking of that and of the bips uh once again you have bits that includes the budget and has also a bit from root but on the fungible bdv um their life the immunify bug Bounty program as well which is a security program and and that is also important I mean they're all important um they're live and would encourage everyone to to vote for them um there are less than 24 hours for some of them to to pass Emilio asks what what steps happened or what happens if the bips don't pass problems do you wanna you wanna answer that I mean we don't really know right so it depends which bits I think each of the bibs not passing would mean something different for being stuck and that's a bridge will cross if we get there uh yeah we'll see what happens I guess it's never the end if it doesn't pass even if it's um maybe it is but um if it's if it's one that you know the reason to be said for there's something to be said sorry to cut you off Matt but if the Dao is just never gonna pass another Bib and Beanstalk is Never Gonna upgrade itself because at some point beanstalk's probably not going to make it right being Stock's still not at the point where it's it's done and it's just gonna run and so if this sends a become term problem that no bips are being passed and even things like bip 24 where it's an architectural upgrade and it's really non-substantive from a model perspective and doesn't affect any users and it's just an architectural upgrade to try to facilitate interoperability with other protocols if those things start to fail yeah it's tough to know what the future for Beanstalk looks like so this goes back to our our comment from earlier in class around the the nature of forks and how if you have these disagreements that perhaps it is better for the protocol to split as opposed to just dying entirely because it can't upgrade itself maybe it's better to have a split where one version just does nothing and it stays the same and the other version mints the beans and continues to upgrade itself and do does lots of stuff so who knows we I mean we certainly have no idea how this is all gonna play out I think governance of Beanstalk is very much I mean perhaps it's maybe even a bigger question at this point than the economics of being stopped uh and therefore don't don't think I we have a good answer for what uh what's gonna happen if if these bips don't pass so we'll see I think it's not unreasonable to expect uh some of them if they don't pass to um to be reproposed perhaps uh but I don't know this is this is funky but again don't think it's a bad thing that the votes are coming down to the wire either and don't want to be like fudding you know if if these bips don't pass Beanstalk is it's like well the Dow the Dow has opinions and you know as of now go with the doubt because that's the way governance is set up so uh I think this is a problem that will continue to improve uh over time and and is a these are just great data points for us collectively as we start to think about how should the governance system work in perpetuity or in the long run at least uh these are really fundamental examples or instances of problems that the Dow is going to have to solve and yeah it's not so cut and dry not so cut and dry I guess we'll take it one one bit at a time um or or in this case five five dips at a time yeah one one bit at a time I think that's uh the next uh Beethoven song it has to be a Jordan Sparks a Jordan Sparks remix yeah that might uh encourage it incentivize uh voting all right um we're at the end of today's class thank you everyone uh for joining and for those who um ask questions or uh or send them um thank you Publius as always for taking the time to answer all these questions and we'll see you all next week thank you man