• Recordings
• Notes
• Pod Options—what if we had options for Pods? For example, a Pod holder could sell an option to sell the Pods but wouldn’t sell them outright, but the buyer would have the option to buy the Pods at a particular price.
• Let’s say at 90 cents Depositors are not Converting. Is it ok for Depositors to not be Converting right away?
• When is it appropriate to pay contributors and when is it not?
• Given how long the Well implementation, any consideration for using Uniswap in the meantime?
• “what's your time allocation looked like lately, and do you have any thoughts on where you'll spend it over the coming months?”
• Would it make sense to rebalance seeds for unripe assets to remove the opportunity cost for conversions from LP to Bean given that liquidity will remain locked? Would it require a BIP?
• “could you justify why eng staff paid around 10k before the exploit receive now almost X2 . Same for lead. Something change before and after the exploit ? you think paying much more contributors help to keep them in the project or will work much more or better.”
• Discussion of Vitalik’s article about DAOs: https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2022/09/20/daos.html
• Transcript

Recordings

Notes

Pod Options—what if we had options for Pods? For example, a Pod holder could sell an option to sell the Pods but wouldn’t sell them outright, but the buyer would have the option to buy the Pods at a particular price.

• Beanstalk should have a wide variety of different derivatives built on top of it
• This probably isn’t the highest value derivative to implement over the short term
• Perhaps get a variety of futures markets up and running first, after that you get a yield curve that forms on top of Beanstalk, then you can get into more sophisticated derivatives
• But certainly makes sense to have derivatives on top of the Pod Market eventually
• Pods never expire. What if Beanstalk started issuing debt that expired at some point?
• If people lend to Beanstalk even when there’s a risk they don’t get paid on any time horizon, that’s probably good for Beanstalk
• But the core peg maintenance model indicates that the FIFO schedule is what people want and it’s working pretty well, probably doesn’t make sense to add more complexity in that regard with unclear benefits

Let’s say at 90 cents Depositors are not Converting. Is it ok for Depositors to not be Converting right away?

• It’s up to the market to decide
• Amount of volatility we’ve seen post-Replant has been very low compared to pre-exploit
• Beanstalk doesn’t currently optimize around the frequency at which the Bean price oscillates above and below a dollar. The protocol is more focused at the moment to just oscillate the price in the first place (as well as the debt level)
• Nothing wrong with it taking time for Conversions, but can always be thinking about how to improve the model and make it optimize around frequency of oscillations as well.
• “quarterly budget talks are taking away from the great work the team is doing. i imagine these budget discussions are going to get progressively worse until there are "slaps". i also imagine meeting quorum will be harder as many ppl will be checking out until Wells and Root. Any thoughts on how to remedy or proactively address these issues?”
• We don’t really feel the quarterly budget talks are taking away from the great work the team is doing!
• For the most part people are being constructive, but definitely some folks that are not. In general though this discussion is very healthy. The DAO shouldn’t give out Beans willy-nilly.
• Regarding reaching quorum, it’s an open question as far as what voter participation looks like. We’ve typically been against delegation, but after some research it seems like it’s hard to avoid it in practice at scale. Definitely something to consider in the future if quorum is hard to reach.

When is it appropriate to pay contributors and when is it not?

• At the end of the day it is up to the DAO to figure out a process to determine when it makes sense to do so and not
• It’s possible for the DAO to mint Beans and pay for things and have value created
• It probably does make sense for the DAO to mint Beans to accelerate the development of Beanstalk for now
• Anyone can propose their own organization and propose to be funded by the DAO
• There’s a lot of work that needs to get done and it’s probably not going to happen in time if there aren’t sufficient incentives to come in and contribute
• There seems to be some discussion about the lack of transparency with regard to the budget funds, but we think it’s kind of amazing how transparent it is and think that any accusations that there’s opacity or deliberate opacity on that front are unfounded
• Comments on insiders
• Beanstalk was designed to have as low ownership concentration as possible. To our knowledge, no individual or group has anywhere near a majority of Stalk and thus Beanstalk is not governed by a small group of people.
• The idea that Beanstalk is governed by insiders is kind of ridiculous, but the idea that Beanstalk Farms is governed by insiders is accurate! The DAO voted 4 members onto the BFC that has discretion to hire and use the budget.

Given how long the Well implementation, any consideration for using Uniswap in the meantime?

• We don’t think that’s a good use of our time, we’re heavily focused on implementing the Wells in a secure and sound fashion
• Uniswap implementation would be a significant distraction and doesn’t seem to be a lot of benefit in doing things halfway or intermediate steps like this
• But if anyone felt strongly that this was a feature they would like, Beanstalk is open source and anyone can do it (and then propose a BIP to whitelist the LP token)
• Any intention to implement Curve gauge for the 3CRV pool for a possible Frax pool?
• Not at the moment but similarly anyone can do it
• We assume there would be some friction with getting added via Curve governance
• Silo still doesn’t support the distribution of yields from other protocols, so marginal benefit for Farmers

“what's your time allocation looked like lately, and do you have any thoughts on where you'll spend it over the coming months?”

• We view our role as making it such that Publius doesn’t need to exist
• We’re thinking about how we can better document things so that people can contribute as permissionlessly as possible.
• The implementation of Wells with on-chain oracles and a generalized Pipeline is something we are working on that will be high leverage
• We’re really just trying to empower everyone who wants to build on Beanstalk

Would it make sense to rebalance seeds for unripe assets to remove the opportunity cost for conversions from LP to Bean given that liquidity will remain locked? Would it require a BIP?

• It would require a BIP
• The simplest implementation would be to make them the same Seeds
• This may be a great idea!

“could you justify why eng staff paid around 10k before the exploit receive now almost X2 . Same for lead. Something change before and after the exploit ? you think paying much more contributors help to keep them in the project or will work much more or better.”

• The reason behind the extra pay is that BF is a leaner organization. BF is running on a much smaller team and budget than pre-exploit. The idea is to pay a smaller set of high value contributors well.

Discussion of Vitalik’s article about DAOs: https://vitalik.eth.limo/general/2022/09/20/daos.html

• There seem to be both concave and convex problems that are currently presented to the DAO, and solutions should probably account for that
• Concave example: distribution of Seeds for each whitelisted asset (Stalk gauge system)
• Certain policy decisions like the implementation of a Dutch auction where it’s binary (should the DAO implement the auction or not, or another type of auction), a.k.a. convex decisions
• Think that BF/BS and their relationship to the DAO is probably more optimal implementation than the one in Vitalik mentions
• There’s no single lead of BF, but instead more committee based leadership
• He also talks about the oracle problem, but certainly think there’s a solution to this where you have various providers of the price and a contract that finds some sort of average
• Vitalik also says that stablecoins should first and foremost be stable and decentralized before being efficient.
• Agree 100%
• Beanstalk very explicitly makes a tradeoff in short term volatility for long term stability

Transcript

foreign how are you I'm doing very well I see we have a few questions at the Town Hall chat would encourage others to drop them as well I see so much typing and maybe we can start with other questions starting with one that was more of an idea from Brian about pod options and the thinking here Publius is what if we have options for pods and it'll be something as the following so a pod holder would sell an option to basically sell their pods but wouldn't sell them outright and then depending on the person who would buy that option would then have the option to exercise basically you know that agreement and buy the buy the pods or not so similar to a stock but basically for pods does this make sense and if yes what are your thoughts on it so just to try to understand because I hadn't been following the discussion the thought is that that if you have pods that you would be able to sell what covered calls yep that's it let's say I have 1000 pods so I would be like uh uh I'm selling the option to sell those 1000 Pods at a certain price uh on someone with the option to buy those pods because you have the pods right so you're selling the option to buy them so you're selling a call you have the pods you're selling a covered call what's the question well just the idea of of having like a secondary Market uh fourth pods uh on being stuck basically well the current pod Marketplace is a secondary Market I guess what you're talking about now is a derivative Market on top of the secondary Market uh uh not I mean at the end of the day Beanstalk should have a wide variety of different derivatives built on top of it uh there's no reason why typical call and put options contracts that are implemented in a generalized fashion on top of being stuck you know there's no reason to think that won't be implemented at some point uh it's probably not the highest value derivative to implement over the short term uh just you know in in general probably want to get like at least a Futures market up and running first or a variety of different Futures markets that are dependent on either the the minting schedule or some other parameters and then once you have a Futures market then there can start to be sort of a yield curve that forms uh on top of on top of Beanstalk and then once you have a yield curve I think then you can get into more sophisticated derivatives but it's hard to hard to think that uh calls and puts are are the the first thing that should be built at this point but certainly makes sense to build them at some point do you think root would be the right the right place or or want to build something like that well can't speak on behalf of root I think that the way as we understand it that the root markets are going to be implemented uh it's probably possible to have the Futures markets uh implemented on top of root because it's being implemented and it's officially generalized fashion uh but just talking out loud before you get to options you probably want a couple of other different markets as well on top of being stuck like a money market uh probably some sort of CDP system uh probably a Perpetual Futures Market uh and then it might make sense to have more traditional option but totally option traditional options are not necessarily the most popular at this point okay the follow-up the question or from the discussion did is something that we might have touched uh on uh earlier which has a different kind of pods with an expiry date so the ones that we have right now are non-callable or let's say they have no no and they never expire what if Beanstalk started issuing pods with an expired idiot when you say expiry do you mean maturity so while it would be something such as let's say you know you you would buy a pod uh or buy Pods at a certain temperature or a certain interest rate that are meant to get paid let's say in the next two months if being stock doesn't mean within the next two months then those pods expire and that's it well there's something to be said for the fact that From beanstalk's perspective if people are willing to lend to it uh with a risk of not getting paid back at all that's probably better for Beanstalk uh but frankly the core Peg maintenance model requires that the first in first out pod line is what most people want uh and that that model remains really strong and don't necessarily think that it makes sense to add add other types of PODS uh to the field that's probably a lot of additional complexity with unclear benefits to Beanstalk in the grand scheme of things one of the things that makes Beanstalk really attractive to lend to is its credit worthiness and the fact that it will never default on pods and therefore uh having pods that it would default on is probably going to hurt the long-term credit worthiness of being stock but uh yeah it's hard to know uh without hearing more specific implementation details but those would be like high level thoughts agree there's especially that it will impact the I mean those being mentors will be distributed that is going to impact or come out of something else so it may impact the the main pot line or if you take it out from the side it will impact that as well okay there has been some discussions uh with regards to converting or convert so the price of being right now is hovering just below a dollar at 99 Cents and there are some questions on why aren't uh you know you know their Farmers converting and bringing bringing it back uh to Peg and my question well and there has been some answers saying that you know just 99 cents is not attractive enough for people to convert uh some or others want to you know seeing that the seeds maybe the four seeds uh uh are more attractive to retain rather than the the Arbitrage opportunity uh from the prices Peg my question Publius is let's say even at 90 cents or 85 cents uh as as long as farmers oversided depositors are keeping their deposits in The Silo and not converting but not withdrawing as well does that does that indicate anything is is that negative in itself if you know if people are not converting right away is it okay to not convert and maintain a certain price well at the end of the day that's really up to the market to decide and there's nothing that Beanstalk can do other than the Dow can continue to try to improve its model over time to encourage stronger and stronger Peg maintenance so frankly the amount of volatility we've seen since replant is really low compared to the volatility experience post replant and the fact that nonetheless the question remains how can stability be increased in deviations from the peg be decreased it's really positive right it means that this is a model that still has room to grow and to improve and you pointed you particularly with the seed disparity between uh LP and beans one really clear place where over time uh the Dow can make improvements to the peg maintenance model to encourage even tighter Peg maintenance now from a theoretical perspective it's important to note that Beanstalk doesn't doesn't optimize at this point in time around frequency of Peg crosses in any capacity it only optimizes around uh crossing the price above and below its Peg and its debt level and so while there are ways that over time uh Beanstalk can uh Implement Peg maintenance mechanisms that are uh more short-term oriented to facilitate uh a certain frequency of oscillations above and below Peg the reality is that the protocol is more focused uh at this point in time on just creating the oscillations at any point in time and then it is relying on at some point market makers to step in and start to convert closer and closer to the peg because they're competing with one another so there is some question of price Discovery around how low and how high will the price go in each oscillation above and below the peg before people start to convert and that's an open question so uh there is something to be said for Beanstalk can continue to refine its incentives around conversion but there's nothing wrong from being suspected with it taking some time in order for there to be price Discovery around uh conversions yes do you think Beanstalk will want to optimize with regards to the time it takes you know for for Silo depositors to convert this is part of you know the market as you said the price Discovery So eventually you want to go back to Peg but you don't want to go back to Peg immediately so it's okay to stay at 90 cents for some time or 95 cents for some time until you know the volatility takes effect well similarly Beanstalk doesn't optimize around volatility right it really only optimizes around price and debt level and so there is a question of with regards to the oscillations uh what is an acceptable volatility uh and what is the acceptable time over which each oscillation happens or that volatility is realized those are unanswered questions at this point in time and there is something to be said for the the Beanstalk model should probably be upgraded to include some optimization around oscillation time and volatility of oscillations but this that is a uh an optimization that's probably going to take a little bit of time to really think through and particularly there are still some some optimizations to the to the model that are perhaps more important to get done first like the demand for so or I guess the the Dutch auction implementation in the field is what what the right thing to call it is so there's lots of things that can be done to further upgrade the the peg maintenance model The Stockade system being another one uh how The Stockade system is implemented that in particular could could be optimized around volatility and the the duration of oscillation certainly so something to think about as the systems are designed okay the next question is uh from gems um maybe this mode of uh touching upon some of the discussions that has been going on with regards to the uh the budget dip and I'm going to read out his his comment so he says the quantity budget talks are taken away from the great work the team is doing I imagine that these budget discussions are going to get progressively worse until there are until you know there are siloaments I also Imagine meeting column would be harder as many people will be checking out until there are more developments within Beanstalk such as you know Wells and and the markets from root any thoughts on how to remedy or proactively address these issues well first off we kind of disagree that the the talks around the budget or budgets are taking away from the work that the team is doing we would we would argue that having a governance system whereby anyone that is receiving funding from the Dow is directly and regularly accountable to the Dow that seems to be really important and while it does seem like some people are throwing out things that are not the most constructive and that's certainly I mean that's just the way things are unfortunately that not everyone is willing to be the most constructive for the most part people are pretty constructive uh you know this is this is healthy this is part of the part of the process and as the as the Dow currently is structured there are multiple bodies that are currently working for the Dow they each have slightly different structures to them uh Beanstalk farms and bean sprout being the two and the discussions around budgets are are very healthy the Dow shouldn't be giving out beans willy-nilly and General skepticism around hey what's all this being spent on it's very important it's very important so perhaps uh some people that are being a little bit less constructive they can try to be more constructive that would be great but otherwise uh the discussion is is healthy we think uh we did write a pretty long comment in the Beanstalk Farms budget proposal bip uh Channel voicing some of our thoughts around uh the the ability for Beanstalk to Mint beans and uh some of people's comments in that channel uh but with regards to Jam's comment around the reaching Quorum and people checking out uh that's something that will it's an open question uh around what what what voter participation looks like historically voter participation has been very good uh one thing we've we've typically been against is delegation but upon doing a little bit more research into governance it seems like delegate there's nothing you can really do to stop delegation and practice uh so and and more than that it can really help smaller Farmers uh join together to feel like their voices are heard so perhaps the implementation of a delegation system might be worth considering if there ends up being a difficulty in reaching quorums for bits in the future but so far that hasn't happened we'll see what what the next couple of bits uh look like there's some technical bits and Budge a bit there's a one div 24 is is hopefully going to be proposed in the next 24 hours uh all of that that discussion has been happening publicly for a couple days now uh bib25 is also probably ready to go uh in the next day or two uh bib26 doesn't seem ready to go in the next day or two the bug Bounty uh but after speaking with Mr manifold it does seem like there may be a bean sprout budget happening as well in the next couple days so uh we'll see what collectively I guess we'll see what what voter participation looks like on on all of those bips and go from there but uh don't necessarily think that it's a problem that there are high frictions around changing being stock or minting beans to fund things in fact it's probably a very good thing that it's high friction to to try to change being stuck and I dropped the um your your comment uh in the in the budget discussion and the at the tunnel chat so for this there's a few if you would like to read it it's linked there and purpose I wanted to touch a little bit more about that given that so you mentioned when is it appropriate for the Dow uh you know to Mint dunes and and pay contributors and you are the founder you are a contributor uh with being stuck but you are an unpaid let's say uh contributor there are there are many let's say criticisms that could be given towards you know how and when contributors are paid so for starters it was let's not pay contributors and pods for example um then um let's not pay contributors when when the protocol is posed and this is something that really came out from the contributors it wasn't mentioned by you know uh um the community then let's not pay contributors when there are no mints maybe in the future it would be like YP contributors when there are meants given that you know the protocol is already running so why do we need uh uh contributors to BP of them when do you think it's appropriate to pay contributors and when is it not so figure out a process to evaluate when it makes sense to spend beans and when it doesn't from a theoretical perspective and we wrote a little bit about this in the channel there are theoretically multiple stable equilibria with the bean price at a dollar with different total Bean supplies and what that means is that or perhaps better than being supplies to the better way to say there's demand for Beats although they're obviously uh related uh the the point being that it is possible for the Dow to Mint beings and spend those beans effectively such that even if those beans that are paid to contributors are to some extent sold and it creates short-term uh net supply for beans uh the there there is the potential for Value creation that creates utility for beans or some other value that ends up creating demand for Beats and particularly at this early stage where there's a ton of development to be done to get to the point where there's a full open source Tech stack and a relatively complete base Beanstalk layer as well as some key derivatives and Primitives built on top of it as as has been discussed already in this class uh it probably does make sense for the Dow to continue to Mint beans to fund or accelerate the funding of development of Beanstalk uh one of the we we many many months ago this is probably almost a year ago at this point uh spent a lot of time trying to spin up be in stock farms and being Sprout and attract a wide variety of contributors to come work on being stuck through these two different uh organizations and we're very intent on making sure that it was through these organizations and not directly through the Dow such that there is some separation of church and state between the Dao and these various contribution groups and the hope is that if people that are part of the Dow are part of the Beanstalk Community or be an economy feel like they should be entitled to or can can create value for the Dow in some way and are not being included or considered in the current processes that exist than the various organizations that the Dow does fund that anyone can in a totally permissionless way propose a bip to create their own organizations and ask for funding from the Dow So currently there are two different organizations with pretty radically different funding mechanisms and designs in order to encourage totally different types of contributions to be in stock and both seem to be working very well to create value so if we look at being Sprout first being Sprout incubated uh one Beanstalk native company already root and root uh I mean the most the most immediate benefit that Beanstalk has had for root uh is that root was able to fund a significant portion of the halborn retainer uh and that has already started to pay dividends with the the job function uh bug being discovered or vulnerability being discovered as well as the continuous audit of uh new new bibs bib24 has been audited by halborn the Pod Marketplace P2 is being audited by halborn and that was a symbiotic relationship between the Dao and root that was facilitated by bean sprout and the hope is that bean sprout can continue to facilitate new businesses to be created uh on top of Beanstalk or to start to migrate some of their business to be in stock and then in Beanstalk Farms uh from our perspective there is a little bit of friction at the moment around the fact that there isn't a full open source Tech stack to interact with Beanstalk if you look at the back end in particular being Sprout has been able to attract route to build uh on top of Beanstalk uh on the back end uh both submitting a bib to upgrade Beanstalk and working on contracts on top of being stocked uh that's really facilitated because the back end is is open source the front end and the middleware stack is getting there and the the halborn relationship is very important to open source in the front and they're currently doing some pen testing on the front end and the hope is for being stock Farms to open source that in the near future but as I hope is apparent there's this whole diverse ecosystem of very uh value creating different groups that are all working together and are all generally funded by or have starter funds from the Beanstalk Dow and if you look at the amount of value that is being created by all of these people that are building on top of Beanstalk are building parts of Beanstalk in some capacity or building tools to interact with Beanstalk it's very hard to think that over the next year to two years that this isn't money that's really well spent by the Dow if the goal is to have Beanstalk in a place where during the next bull market it has all of the tools and accoutrement that anyone could want in order to to use in any capacity that they would like there's a lot of work that needs to get done and it's not going to happen uh it's not going to happen in time most likely if there aren't sufficient incentives for people to come and contribute and the Dow does have the ability to to mend beans in order to facilitate a lot of that development and that's a a pretty powerful thing and so it would probably be a mistake for the Dow to not not meant any beans uh it would also be be a mistake for the doubt him in too many beans so again this goes back to at the beginning our comment that there is really a lot of uh really positive uh things about all of the scrutiny around how this money is being spent and whether it's good to spend it but at this point there really are clear things that that should be done are being done and from our perspective most importantly are being done in a really decentralized and transparent fashion just would take this opportunity to to respond to some of the criticisms that uh were seem to be uh uh made that that there's a lack of transparency around development and who's getting paid for What from our perspective it's kind of amazing the amount of transparency around where all of this money is being spent what it's being spent on who it's being spent uh uh who it's being paid to uh the amount of transparency from Beanstalk Farms is really amazing from our perspective and think that some of those criticisms are are pretty unfounded so uh perhaps there's room for improvement we would argue there's always room for improvement good better fast uh but think that the the accusations that there's some opacity or deliberate opacity I think that's probably not uh not fair so there's a lot that can be done in general to improve these processes that the Dow has to fund various development projects but uh do want to just uh extend some kudos to to the current contributors for all of their transparency one other thing that there seems to be a bit of confusion on it is you know what is the Dow and and you've mentioned that in the comments saying that Beanstalk Farms is is not a doubt there has been a few comments as well uh with the thinking that you know there are a few uh let's say like insiders or a few uh uh maybe contributors uh who control the Dao and then they basically pass pass uh uh devotes um and and the liking was that you know if you're a fund manager and you're you're managing the funds of of some people uh you choose how to spend that money is is that a correct characterization where the Dao is managing the fund of others when you know it is the opposite that the customers or let's say the case stockholders are literally the Dow they are the voters so there's I mean frankly think that that characterization is it's kind of it's unfair for a variety of reasons uh hedge fund is a fiduciary uh of other people's Capital uh whereas and even if some of that Capital may be their own uh in most cases there's there's some fiduciary responsibility for other people's Capital uh in this case the Dao is is the people it's it's their own Capital meaning there is no separation between the the people whose capital it is and the the ability to participate in governance so if anyone has capital in the system if anyone has deposited value in the system they are a part of the Dow and they can participate in its governance uh so I think that in general it's not the concept of a hedge fund managing other people's money is not is not the right analogy at all now the the concept of is Beanstalk is the Dow run by insiders frankly think that that's the idea that that's suggested is not surprising uh in general any any if you look at the history of cryptocurrencies the vast majority of them uh have have had minting mint schedule such that they are controlled by us select few individuals in perpetuity uh one of the things that Beanstalk has has always done differently is that it's been designed to have as low and ownership concentration as possible and the result is that for better or worse uh as far as we know there is no individual or any even group of individuals that have anything close to a majority of stock at this point and so it really is to the best of our knowledge uh Beanstalk is not governed by a select few set of individuals and there there is a there is a real decentralized governance process happening here again we we we may we may be totally ignorant there may be there may be some group of people that have a ton of stock and we don't we don't know about it uh participation in Beanstalk is pseudonymous through wallets and we don't know who owns most of the wallets so we could be totally ignorant but without some sort of I mean it people are going to say what they're going to say but think that the concept that being stuck is controlled by insiders is kind of ridiculous uh the idea that Beanstalk Farms is controlled by insiders is of course accurate there are people that there are four people that have proposals that were each approved by the Dow to have the ability to hire members of Beanstalk farms and to work uh for the Dow at through Beanstalk Farms so it makes a ton of sense that Beanstalk Farms itself is uh somewhat controlled by insiders because in order to do anything in particular you need some some level of centralization and accountability so the way Beanstalk Farms is currently structured each of those P four people are directly accountable to the Dow and they have the ability to hire people and those people report to those four people directly and then those four people report directly to the dash so there is reporting but there is also very clear control of the budgets and there's only really quarterly accounting of those budgets so to a large extent there is Beanstalk Farms is controlled by insiders and that's on purpose and if we go back to what we were talking about before the separation between the Dow and Beanstalk Farms is essential such that if you want to come work on being stuck and you don't want to be a part of Beanstalk Farms or part of being Sprout you want to create your own organization and you want starter funds go propose a bit this is a decentralized community and everyone's welcome so this has been real really carefully designed over the past year plus by a wide variety of contributors and Us in order to try to make this as open uh and permissionless a development environment as possible and as you've mentioned that the centralized let's say binson Farms answers and is accountable to the Dow maybe maybe to close uh this topic side of Chad who is a BFC bfcp member wrote a relatively detailed message that highlights or what all of the engineering team are working on okay the next question comes from Bacchus and he asks given the longer time Horizon for the well implementation has there been any discussion about using a unit swap being if pool in the meantime and he asks what are the pros and cons of such an idea at least on RN there hasn't been any discussion about that we don't think that's a good use of our time we're heavily focused on implementing the wells as soon as possible and think that getting the Beanstalk native well designed done properly will then facilitate the rollout of potentially a wide variety of different liquidity pools with beans trading against different assets uh to to now pivot at least our time to work on the being Eve beneath uniswap pool we think that would be a pretty heavy distraction and would be a non-trivial task and it's probably not gonna really make a difference in terms of when the the bean eat pool is launched maybe a couple of weeks or yeah a month or two at the most but it at this point don't think that there's a lot of benefit to being stuck and doing things halfway or doing doing really intermediate steps like this where there's it's short term and then there's going to be significant friction around switching and it just seems like a total distract so uh from our perspective not a good use of time obviously because Beanstalk is open source if anyone wanted to uh deploy a beneath pool and propose a bit to whitelist the lp token they could do so uh they would they would also most likely need to be code written to facilitate converts between uh the beneath LP tokens and uh beans but if anyone can do that so if someone felt strongly that that was that was a feature that they'd like uh as always they can they can go ahead and do that but at least on our end haven't haven't thought that that's a good use of time and as far as we know it neither beanstop Farms nor root is is working on a beneath pool at this point so that's the current status Marcus then asks as well if there is any intention to implement a curved gauge for the three curve pool s you know for the whole earth ecosystem not at this point in time on this end but again that's something that anyone can kind of lead a campaign to do and this is a relatively permissionless environment so anyone can can make that proposal as well but don't don't think that's a good use of of our time and frankly getting the curve gauge last time was a huge to do and immediately after the the pool got the gauge it was exploited and so we're going to assume that there's gonna be some some friction around getting that that gauge and again The Silo currently or not again but the silo still doesn't support the distribution of yield from other protocols so even if there was gauge it wouldn't it wouldn't be a an addition to the silo yield it would be an option instead of The Silo yield so marginal benefit for farmers also that the intention is to move away from the curve pool into into the well so that'll be a shorter proposal or thinking unless there are others who would like to have a curved pool yeah all right next question comes from cyberchat and he asks Publius what's your time allocation looked like literally do you have any thoughts on where you'll spend it over the coming months he imagines that you're thinking a lot about economics doing these calls Etc how can Beanstalk Farms or the Dow help you spend your time more effectively so from our perspective we really view our role as trying to make it such that Publius doesn't need to exist and there's no dependency or Alliance or need for Publius whatsoever and so to some extent what that what that consists of is trying to really Empower all of the current contributors and new potential contributors to be able to build on top of being stuck uh we're we're trying to we're trying to really think about what what does uh uh not a finished product of Beanstalk but what does a maybe like an MVP of derivatives and functionality and features that you need to have implemented on top of being stuck in The Silo such that there is some sort of self-perpetuating process that starts to take place and more than just the the the things themselves how can we operate in such a fashion that other people feel empowered to go build all of those things so if anything we're really trying to figure out how can we better document what what we have in mind or what we think and what things might want might might look like in their close to final product as we envision it and obviously it's up to the Dow to figure out what makes sense to implement but there's there's probably over the next year uh as we've been talking about throughout this class A Series of different uh protocols and derivatives that should be built directly on top of beanstalker as close to Beanstalk as possible such that when businesses and real economic activities start to happen on top of being stocked there's a wide variety of derivatives available for these businesses to get exactly the exposures that they want because the reality is if you're running a sophisticated business you're going to have a sophisticated treasury management function and having access to all of the necessary derivatives such that you can really customize what your exposure looks like of your treasury that's going to be an important part of facilitating Real World Adoption uh between between businesses and Beanstalk so what does that look like exactly still trying to figure it out what is our role in that process uh we're trying to have as minimal a role in that process as possible while recognizing that there is a lot of work to do and there's nothing we'd rather be doing than working on Beanstalk and so uh we're really just trying to figure out how to be the most high leverage contributor contributors that we can to be in stock uh think that in the short term the implementation of a couple of features like the wells with on-chain oracles and a generalized pipeline those are a couple of things that we're pretty excited about uh in implementing or working on uh that we think are going to be high leverage and then also just trying to help new developers and new contributors or people that have been working on Beanstalk for a while but are still getting to the point where they feel comfortable building all of their own stuff uh we're really just trying to empower everyone else to to come build on top of Beanstalk and that means uh strong documentation that means a wide variety of different derivatives and stuff built on top of Beanstalk and then obviously that means a strong uh Peg maintenance movable and we also are spending some time trying to figure out the on-chain governance so lots of different stuff to be done uh particularly around documentation and historically we've spent an immense amount of time of our time working on documentation particularly the white paper and think that making sure that there are all of the resources available such that people can come in and start to really build on Beanstalk without needing to ever talk to Publius or or can with ever talking to anybody potentially uh that's really something to work towards so uh hopefully that's helpful but in general still probably spending uh a question of our our day-to-day on calls with with all the contributors and just trying to answer questions and make sure everyone's everyone has all of the resources that they need such that they feel empowered to to continue to work on Beanstalk as effectively as they can and valuable guidance either actively or through documentation that directs them back is asked I'm not sure if I'm pronouncing urine correctly so please correct me if I'm not and he asks if it makes sense to rebalance seeds for the unripe assets so we remove you know the four seeds or two seeds with the unraved assets to remove the friction when it comes to conversion it would require a bip uh but that's actually a great idea um perhaps I mean it's it's hard to I mean you can the the simplest implementation would really just to either be to make them the same seeds uh or to make them much closer together and that may that may actually be just a great idea uh and that wouldn't require any sophisticated upgrades to the stock system or anything like that that's a very interesting idea what that this was brought up all right the next one comes from if wallet and he asks if you could justify why he says engineering staff that maybe we can talk about all contributors in general so why do contributors today are getting paid almost twice as much as they did pre-exploit and he asks did something change before and after the exploit do you think now that you paying much more contributors will help to keep them in the project or like work better I'm happy to answer that purpose but feel free to answer it if you if you would like to say not sure we're the right people to answer that you can't beat stock pharmacists its own organization the the thinking behind the extra pay is is that Beanstalk Farms is now a linear organization so if even if you look into the overall budget binso Farms is now running on a smaller budget uh pre-exploit and with a smaller team so while the contributors may be paid more than they did before the overall uh budget is is lowered if that makes sense if wallet gems also touches upon that earlier contributors were able to be paid in pods and and now they don't have that option okay let's go to a question from Canadian Bennett and it's more of wanting your thoughts on on an article by vitalik Publius unless that they dropped it last week and Kennedy Bennett asked the question last week but the article had just been posted then not sure if you had the chance to read that article and if you'd like to comment on it yeah did did my homework uh to be able to talk about this if you had any specifics or or if you wanted could just talk a little bit about it but happy to answer specific questions as well sure thing maybe I can just start with the overall idea of the of the paper of the blog post and and just go through them some of your thoughts uh on it and and I will summarize I think correct me uh Publius uh if I missed any points on it and the general thinking or theme of the of the blog post is that you know dials are not corporations or the difference between you know governance between corporations and let's say daos or or governments um and and vitalik starts uh this this question or the blog post with the idea or the thought of uh when there's a choice to be made between you know two choices uh so A and B um and and he he summarizes it or splits them between concave and convex um decisions and the thinking is that when there are two choices to be made that is it you is it do you want to have a compromise so is it something in between a and b or is it a coin flip where it's either a uh or a b and then he gives some examples on what what might be a concave and what might be uh convex so for example uh during the pandemic it didn't make sense to have something in between we either all had to you know follow certain rules or none at all but in between isn't isn't something that is uh productive um while on the other hand uh having something like funding public goods or tax rates it doesn't make sense to either go 0 or 100 something in between is is more uh productive and then he Likens that to how governance uh and corporations work and and he gives his opinion on where he thinks uh Dao's fit an in-between and he thinks that Dallas could be either depending on what is the answer that they are trying or the problem that they are trying uh to solve does that sound like a good summary purpose and what do you think about that generally sounds correct uh as a summary we would say that there there seem to be both concave and convex uh problems that are currently presented to the Dao and therefore it may make sense as a an on-chain governance solution is re-implemented for the different problems that face the doubt to be broken down and the different implementation or the different governance uh implementations that may exist collectively as a single implementation are different depending on the type of decision or problem that the Dow faces so an example of a concave problem may be the amount of seeds per per bdv for a given asset compared to other assets and it's probably best that the Dow collectively isn't making a binary decision even though as we just talked about it may make sense to as a one-off change the seeds for the unripe beans uh if we if if you think about the gauge system as a whole it probably makes sense for some sort of continuous uh gauge voting process to happen where there's a uh the Voting is is considered in more of a concave way where everyone's votes are are averaged together and the gauge on any given asset is the result of an average of votes uh on the other hand you certainly have certain policy decisions like the implementation of a Dutch auction uh where it is kind of binary or it should the Dow implement the duck Doctrine or not is the implementation of a Dutch auction better than the implementation of a different style auction uh is it better or worse than the current implementation those are are binary choices and therefore it's important that the the governance system is is adapted to facilitate both decision-making processes at the moment the Dow is really only poised to make convex decisions uh but as we've spoken about the introduction of the gauge system would would be closer to a concave decision making process or a a decision making process optimized around a concave problem so uh definitely that is the thinking that this is heading now if we kind of jump ahead to the other part of his article where he talks about the the structure of doubts in an optimal fashion uh I think that to a large extent that Beanstalk farms and bean sprout in their relationship to the Dow is probably even like a more optimal implementation than than vitalik has because there's not a single uh lead of being stock Farms but instead of generalized uh a more committee based leadership where there's a team and then the team as a whole that's accountable so uh there's maybe one additional layer of abstraction uh in the Beanstalk Dow structure currently uh relative to the structure that vitalik laid out but feel like beanstalk's dowstruck for certainly heading in the right direction uh after after reading some of this now uh he also talks about uh the Achilles heel of algorithmic stable coins and it's the Oracle and to some extent the Oracle was what was exploited uh when Beanstalk was was attacked in EX in April uh and that's one of the reasons why getting the oracles right on the on the the wells is so important but feel like there is uh certainly certainly a path forward for on-chain oracles and uh the way to to the way to do that or the way we've been thinking about doing that is somewhat similar to what he what he described for you have various providers of different prices and then a contract that be it some sort of average or uh aggregate price based on the the various different Oracles so uh that that is all of these things are generally uh and I think people can verify because we've been talking about this stuff in class for on a weekly basis for a while that this seems to be generally the direction that the Dow is head in now I haven't looked too much into claros that he mentioned so don't really have any thoughts there um other than you know he talked about insiders having too much of a vote and uh that being a problem for clarison uh again just want to highlight that historically don't think that's been a problem for being stuck and if anything over time due to the nature of the stock system the the ownership concentration of stock really has been decreasing such that at this point there there really isn't any any anyone with a a significance all right well someone remind me what uh where I was when I dropped out so that I can keep uh to try to repeat myself perhaps or uh not sure if we lost mod as well just a an absolute disaster here at the end of class can you hear me mod I don't know what happened a bomb went off I guess my bad I thought I had the problem so I I left and I think I think we're back now all right well I think a lot of it could have been me it could have been who knows uh I apologies regardless what were we uh what were we chatting about before before I dropped um I think it was the last bit you were talking about the concentration of ownership uh uh within being stuck uh uh yes so uh if you look at I mean he just talked a little bit about claros uh in his article how there was one Dev that had to 25 stake uh I think at this point Beanstalk is well past that level of decentralization or ownership concentration and uh certainly certainly no single debt as a 25 stake to our knowledge or no no stockholder or no individual so uh that's that's obviously a problem if you're going to have a decentralized court system or a decentralized governance system and think that that's that's one of the powers of the stock system uh the other thing we were talking about uh during our minute or two of blackout uh before was about the optimism uh retroactive funding that he talks about in the article and in particular think that it's much better to pay proactively uh or or at least to approve grants for things uh proactively and then once the grants are what whatever the grant specifies has been built to pay them for building it right there needs to be some appraisal of what value there is for work that is going to be done in advance think that it's a lot less meaningful for Builders to pay them after the fact after they've already built it and demonstrated product Market fit it's like thanks but at this point there's no need for a grant like there's already product Market fit so the real benefit of a grant or a subsidy is before it's built to accelerate its development so that might be one place where we perhaps disagree with or not disagree but but uh have some thoughts that on what he said that are not exactly aligned and otherwise you know I at the end I like his note about uh should Dallas learn more from corporate governance or political science and we're generally more on the political science uh uh side of the spectrum as well so I think that this is more of a human nature problem than anything else and uh we're excited to work with the Dow over the next couple months to figure out how exactly to re-implement on-chain governance and uh not just implement it but implement it in a way where there's it has the ability to solve both concave and convex problems in in a high quality fashion so uh yeah a lot lots lots to think about as the Dow moves back to a sophisticated on-chain governance structure but lots to be excited about as well yeah he also touched a bit upon the purpose of the Dao and he likened it to where for example a sovereign entity or let's say like a government that that mainly its purpose is to look at security uh while other uh corporations uh their their purpose was to do you know internal Services let's say where they don't have to worry about you know the outer layer of of security and and such things and he was like there are certain uh there's and I'm summarizing here um um or rephrasing uh as well where some some Dows who would be doing you know uh depending depending on the kind of service that they're offering and one of them is like issuing a currency that would be more aligned towards a southern let's say or government-like uh governance rather than a corporation one problems I wanted to touch upon one of the last comments he said about a stable coin which was that a stable coin does not need to be efficient it must be first and foremost stable and decentralized do you agree with that sentence and do you think that there is a difference between efficiency and stability at scale a hundred percent agree uh if you look at convertibility that's primarily the main feature there where there's some loss in efficiency or stability but a major gain in the overall sustainability of the system so Beanstalk very explicitly makes a trade-off around short-term volatility in favor of long-term stability and think that vitalik's comments are generally pretty aligned with that I think I think we went through uh the blog post Canadian Bennett isn't with us today but if you listen to this recording and you think we missed any of the points please feel free to drop them and we can discuss them at next week's class okay we're at the top of the hour we have one minute left we can leave that maybe if anyone else has some thoughts uh or the last question to uh to ask so let's give it a minute before we end this class all right thank you everyone for joining us uh this week and probably as as always thank you for taking the time to answer all of these questions and see you next week thanks man